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ABSTRACT
Few historians have focused on the critical importance of wartime Reconstruction and 
federal policy toward "contrabands," slaves who took advantage of wartime chaos and 
escaped into Northern territory and the lines of the Union army. Indeed, the overarching 
successes and failures of postbellum Reconstruction often found their origins in the 
innumerable contraband camps where blacks, army officials, and missionary associations 
struggled to define the uncertain limits of "freedom."
The scholars that have looked at contraband settlements have given surprisingly little 
attention to contraband camps in Virginia, especially Freedmen’s Village, a "model" 
settlement that drew unique publicity because of its proximity to Washington and its 
location on the famous and picturesque estate of Robert E. Lee. Overall, this essay seeks 
to evaluate one of America's most famous contraband settlements. Can Freedmen's 
Village be more precisely classified as an experiment in free labor and independence, or 
as a restrictive camp that foreshadowed the tragic failings of postbellum Reconstruction?
. Or does Freedmen's Village defy simple categorization?
In general, government officials and Southern planters rejected the Village 
freedpeople’s version of freedom. Despite Republican pronouncements to the contrary, 
this essay will argue that Republican theories of free labor were never implemented at 
Freedmen's Village; workers were rarely paid and often beaten by Village "overseers," 
while rampant impressment and brutal work schedules prevented freedpeople from 
controlling their time or labor. The federal government's concerns with organizing a 
potentially troublesome and burdensome population and feeding the hungry Union army 
took precedence over introducing freedpeople to a true "free labor" economy.
Historians of wartime and post-war Reconstruction have likewise neglected Virginia's 
Eastern Shore, a fascinating region that officially rejected secession yet held fast to 
traditional Southern values of racism and slavery. When the Shore's most ardent 
secessionists fled to the Confederate mainland, they left a population of landless 
freedpeople in the hands of the Union army and federal government. Thus, the Eastern 
Shore provided an interesting testing ground for wartime Reconstruction policy within a 
nominally Unionist region.
Ironically, the Shore's Unionist stance ultimately worked against the freedpeople of 
Accomac and Northampton counties; while army and government officials confiscated 
Confederate land and constructed contraband farming enterprises throughout the disloyal 
South, officials on the Shore hesitated to take similar steps that would inevitably have 
alienated loyal Shore planters. As a result, federal officials immediately adopted a 
brutally efficient contract labor system. Freedpeople who desperately sought land 
ownership and financial independence were instead contractually hired out to local 
planters under blatantly unfair terms.
The stories of these two communities foreshadowed the larger failures of postbellum 
Reconstruction. Conservative military and Bureau officials motivated by self-interest 
and open racism shunned radical “free labor ideology” and effectively allied with 
Virginia planters to ensure that freedpeople would remain in positions of economic 
dependency.
MEANINGS OF FREEDOM
2Introduction
"De Lord has heard the groans o f  de people, and has come down to deliver! You all 
knows in Dixie you worked de day long, an' never got no satifacshun. But, new, what
you make is yourn!"1
—Virginia slave George Payne on December 31, 1862, one day before the Emancipation Proclamation
was to take effect.
"Mr. President. It is my desire to be free. You will please let me know if  we are free. And what I can 
do. I  write you fo r  advice. Please send me word this week, or as soon as possible 
-Maryland slave to Abraham Lincoln, August 1864
Eric Foner's seminal work, Reconstruction: America's U p  finished Revolution 
1863-1877 (1988), synthesized and added to a generation of scholarship that 
represented Reconstruction as a time of hope and unprecedented opportunity, an era 
marked by black political activism and community development. Foner also tipped 
the scales toward those scholars who saw the Radical Republicans as having been 
genuinely devoted to black political and civil equality and literally radical rather than 
viscerally conservative in their political outlook. Reconstruction historians also agree, 
however, that these radical goals and advances were ultimately undermined by a 
variety of forces that combined to place Southern blacks in a position of economic 
dependence and political impotence. These forces include the rise of Southern 
Democrats united by a program and rhetoric of white supremacy, savagely effective 
violence directed against black voters and community institutions, and the growing 
reluctance of conservative, business-minded Northern Republicans to interfere in 
Southern affairs when national economic problems seemed more urgent.
3Few historians have focused on the critical importance of wartime 
Reconstruction and federal policy toward "contrabands," slaves who courageously 
took advantage of wartime chaos and escaped into Northern territory and the lines of 
the Union army. Indeed, the overarching successes and failures of postbellum 
Reconstruction often found their origins in the innumerable contraband camps where 
blacks, army officials, and missionary associations struggled to define the uncertain 
limits of "freedom." Not surprisingly, the few historians who have closely studied the 
bewildering array of Union contraband camps have been unable to reach an 
interpretive consensus on the nature of the "freedom" that was constantly negotiated 
and renegotiated by freedpeople and their white caretakers.
In From Contraband to Freedman, Louis Gerteis looks at contraband camps 
in nearly every region of the nation and arrives at the decidedly pessimistic 
conclusion that contraband policy was defined by "the failure of the government to 
protect blacks as free laborers," a disastrous shortcoming that "shaped postwar 
policies toward the freedman and in large measure precluded the possibility of radical 
social transformation."4 Numerous localized monographs support Gerteis's general 
argument; C. Peter Ripley and others have emphasized the oppressive nature of Gen. 
Nathaniel Banks's contract labor program in Louisiana during the latter years o f the 
war, and Martha Bigelow and several others have outlined the disturbing tendency of 
army officials in the Mississippi Valley to separate black families and force able- 
bodied males into military service and unfair contractual plantation labor under ex­
masters.5
Other historians have come to startlingly different conclusions. Cam Walker 
claims that a camp in Corinth, Mississippi, "very nearly became a kind of 
independent community,"6 while Janet Lee Hermann and others have revealed the 
existence of a virtually "independent colony of contrabands" at Davis Bend, 
Mississippi, where blacks controlled the agricultural labor process and created a 
functioning plantation court system. Most famously, Willie Lee Rose's prize- 
winning Rehearsal for Reconstruction argues for the brief existence of self-supporting 
contraband colonies on the Sea Islands around Port Royal, South Carolina, where 
blacks cultivated the land under "precarious title" and "took care o f their local
• otroubles with aplomb."
Throughout this historiographical debate9, scholars have given surprisingly 
little attention to contraband camps in Virginia, especially Freedmen's Village, a 
"model" settlement that drew unique publicity because of its proximity to Washington 
and its location on the famous and picturesque estate o f Robert E. Lee.
Contemporary observers hailed Freedmen's Village as a triumph of free labor, an 
orderly and industrious camp that escaped the crowding and disease that devastated 
Washington's urban camps and taught freedpeople the ethic of free labor by allowing 
them to cultivate their own land while forcing them to pay rent and taxes. Moreover, 
visitors commended the vocational training offered at the camp's Industrial School, 
and applauded the top-notch education provided by the missionaries of the American 
Tract Society. Newspaper reporters were happily surprised by the attractively 
whitewashed houses that held separate nuclear families, and officials were pleased
with the medical care provided by the camp hospital and nursing home for elderly 
freedpeople.
The small number of historians who have examined Freedmen's Village have 
rarely questioned the validity of this account; Roberta Schildt has written several 
articles praising the conditions of the camp, while Felix James has focused mostly on 
the legal battles involving the Arlington estate during the 1880s and 1890s. Only 
Joseph Reidy has produced a truly nuanced study of Freedmen's Village, one that 
begins to examine seriously how "freedom" emerged at Arlington; Reidy, however, 
focuses almost exclusively on the conservative administration of the Freedmen's 
Bureau.10
This essay will attempt to build on Reidy's work by placing Freedmen's 
Village within the general historiographical narrative of contraband camps and 
examining the unique version of wartime Reconstruction that emerged in Arlington. 
The essay will proceed chronologically through three stages: the founding of 
Freedmen's Village in the spring of 1863, the Village under military rule from 1863 
until early 1865, and the administration of the Freedmen's Bureau that began in early 
1865. Throughout these stages, careful attention will be given to the interaction of 
government officials, American Tract Society missionaries and teachers, and 
freedpeople themselves in determining the structure and functioning of the Village. 
Overall, this essay seeks to evaluate one of America's most famous contraband 
settlements. Can Freedmen's Village be more precisely classified as an experiment in 
free labor and independence, or as a restrictive camp that foreshadowed the tragic 
failings of postbellum Reconstruction? Or does Freedmen's Village defy simple
6categorization? This essay will attempt to answer these questions by rediscovering 
the experience o f thousands of "contrabands" who tried to define freedom on their 
own terms.
In general, government officials and Southern planters rejected the Village 
freedpeople’s version of freedom. Despite Republican pronouncements to the 
contrary, this essay will argue that Republican theories of free labor were never 
implemented at Freedmen's Village; workers were rarely paid and often beaten by 
Village "overseers," while rampant impressment and brutal work schedules prevented 
freedpeople from controlling their time or labor. The federal government's concerns 
with organizing a potentially troublesome and burdensome population and feeding the 
hungry Union army took precedence over introducing freedpeople to a true "free 
labor" economy.11
Geographic factors also influenced the development of an exploitative, 
publicly controlled labor system at Arlington. Local white residents abandoned the 
Arlington region early in the war, allowing the oncoming Union army to occupy the 
area without a fight. As a result, Union officials could not (at first) emulate the 
contract labor systems used by their counterparts in heavily populated areas of the 
South and Mississippi Valley. Exploitative in their own right, these contract labor 
systems usually amounted to another version of forced labor—one in which military 
and (later) Bureau officials forced freedpeople to sign annual labor contracts with 
local planters.
Lacking a local planter class that needed such farm labor, Union officials 
decided to create a grossly exploitative labor camp—one that could produce food and
7garments for Union soldiers and needy Washington residents. The labor system 
implemented at the Village was therefore the antithesis of the ideal Republican "free 
labor" system; it was public rather than private, and freedpeople were not permitted to 
control the products of their labor and were never compensated at market value.
As the incoming flood of freedpeople caused severe crowding in the Village 
itself, hundreds of Arlington Villagers were moved to a separate settlement on 
Mason's Island, where they were contracted out to Maryland and Virginia planters 
who could travel to the small island and have their pick of available contrabands 
living there. Freedpeople were usually forced to sign restrictive one-year contracts 
and were rarely given fair compensation for their labor. Though private contracts 
appear preferable to Village labor on the surface, in reality such contract systems 
expressed the belief—widely held among military and Bureau officials—that 
freedpeople were fit only for dependent agricultural labor in the postbellum 
economy.12
Predictably, freedpeople resisted both the oppressive Village policy and 
contract-based "free labor"; they escaped contracts, brought planters to justice, and 
agitated for permanent ownership of Village land, hi doing so, Village freedpeople 
articulated their own version of freedom, one based on independent land ownership 
rather than wage labor within a market economy.13
Historians of wartime and post-war Reconstruction have seldom studied 
Virginia's Eastern Shore, a fascinating region that officially rejected secession yet 
held fast to traditional Southern values of racism and slavery. When the Shore's most
ardent secessionists fled to the Confederate mainland, they left a population of 
landless freedpeople in the hands of the Union army and federal government. Thus, 
the Eastern Shore provided an interesting testing ground for wartime Reconstruction 
policy within a nominally Unionist region.
Ironically, the Shore's Unionist stance ultimately worked against the 
freedpeople of Accomac and Northampton counties; while army and government 
officials confiscated Confederate land and constructed contraband farming enterprises 
throughout the disloyal South, officials on the Shore hesitated to take similar steps 
that would inevitably have alienated loyal Shore planters. As a result, federal 
officials immediately adopted a brutally efficient contract labor system. Freedpeople 
who desperately sought land ownership and financial independence were instead 
contractually hired out to local planters under blatantly unfair terms. Despite the 
protests o f angry freedpeople and the genuine efforts of a few government officials, 
Shore planters abused freedpeople and regularly cheated them out of wages. Shore 
freedpeople quickly realized that military and (later) Bureau officials simply did not 
believe in the “free labor ideology” of Radical Republicans; in fact, such officials 
used their power to make sure that the majority of Shore freedpeople would be m no 
position to compete in the postwar economy.14
Tragically, federal non-intervention extended into the post-war years, when 
successful Shore freedpeople (including several ex-Union soldiers who owned 
firearms) fell victim to a violent reign of organized terror directed by local whites. As 
masked white men attacked all signs of black success and community strength,
Freedmen's Bureau officials relied on racist state and county courts that consistently 
acquitted known criminals and refused to allow freedpeople to testify.15
The emergence of a contract labor system on the Eastern Shore also 
underscores the influence of geographic factors on Union policy toward freedpeople. 
While the lack of an immediate planter class forestalled the development of a private 
contract labor system in Arlington, the presence of a large and easily accessible 
planter class on the Shore allowed Union officials to avoid any public responsibility 
for Shore freedpeople by forcing them to sign private contracts with local planters. In 
essence, geographic variations influenced the timing of policy developments; when a 
nearby local planter class was available, government officials implemented a contract 
labor system immediately. When the opposite was true (as in Arlington), military 
officials used the freedpeople for their own purposes before turning them over to 
planters when normal economic conditions began to return in 1865.
The stories of these two communities foreshadowed the larger failures of 
postbellum Reconstruction. Conservative military and Bureau officials motivated by 
self-interest and open racism shunned radical “free labor ideology” and effectively 
allied with Virginia planters to ensure that freedpeople would remain in positions of 
economic dependency.
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Chapter 1: "A Return to Their Healthy Avocations as Field Hands": 
Republican Free Labor Thought and Freedman's Village
"There is a decided advantage afforded to them o f  the salutary effects o f  good pure country 
air, and a return to their form er healthy avocations as fie ld  hands... The arrangement I  propose will 
not only in my opinion conduce to the sanitary and moral improvement o f  the contrabands, but will 
save the Government an immense amount o f  money."
-Lt. Col. Elias M. Greene to Maj. Gen. S. P. Heintzelman on the potential benefits o f  
Freedman's Village, May 1863.16
Maryland and Virginia slaves demanded the establishment o f Freedman's 
Village in the spring of 1863. Indeed, slaves inundated the Union army well before 
the federal government devised an official procedure for handling fugitives. Initially, 
federal officials reassured both loyal and secessionist slaveowners that the Union 
military would not interfere with their peculiar institution and would promptly return 
any fugitives. However, Southern slaves' hunger for freedom outweighed their fear 
of being caught and returned to vengeful masters. Upon entering Virginia in 1861, 
Union army officials were stunned by "the swarms of negroes.. .taking refuge" in 
their lines.17 Slave escapes were often quite creative and dramatic; many slaves on the 
Eastern coast of Maryland and Virginia secretly climbed into Union naval ships, 
while older slave men who encountered friendly Union regiments covertly returned to
1 Rtheir plantations to retrieve their wives and children.
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Consequently, military officers were forced to create a coherent policy for 
dealing with thousands of fugitive slaves. In the spring of 1861, General Benjamin 
Butler famously categorized the slaves as "contraband of war"— material that could 
be confiscated because it was valuable to the Confederate army. Congress 
immediately provided the legal foundation for Butler's military policy of keeping 
runaways by passing the controversial First Confiscation Act, which declared that 
masters who allowed the Confederate army to employ their slaves subsequently 
forfeited all claims to them.
Slaves responded enthusiastically, arriving inside Union fortifications in 
massive numbers. Slaves from Maryland and Virginia flooded Union lines in 
Northern Virginia and escaped to Washington in droves. The process accelerated in 
the summer of 1862, when Congress abolished slavery in the nation's capital and 
passed the decisive Second Confiscation Act, which guaranteed freedom for all slaves 
who successfully escaped from masters residing in Confederate states. Along the 
way, many escapees served as temporary spies for the Union army: the Official 
Records of the war are filled with letters reporting that "a runaway contraband came 
in and reported” Confederate troop movements. ^
Despite the passage of the Confiscation Acts, escape into the Union lines in 
and around Washington was risky, particularly for Maryland slaves. Since Maryland 
remained nominally loyal to the Union, the Confiscation Acts did not apply there; 
runaway slaves from there remained illegal fugitives subject to immediate return and 
reenslavement. However, many Maryland slaves continued to pursue freedom and 
were aided by Union generals and soldiers who openly disobeyed the Fugitive Slave
12
Law. Many Maryland fugitives simply fled to Alexandria County and claimed 
Virginia residency, while others escaped directly to Washington, where Northern 
regiments provided shelter and protection from loyal Maryland slaveholders.
Maryland fugitives undoubtedly would have been reenslaved more 
frequently if  not for relatively unknown abolitionist Union generals like Henry 
Briggs, who boldly defied the orders of his superior officer by safeguarding fugitives. 
When chastised by his commander, Briggs replied, "If the alternative presented to me 
was to deliver (the fugitive) up on the claim of a pretended master or to suffer the 
consequence of a disobedience of law and be dismissed from the service in which I
9 0have volunteered, I should not hesitate to choose the latter."
Maryland politicians and slaveholders were incensed by such blatant 
violations of law. Congressmen Charles Calvert demanded that Secretary of War 
Simon Cameron "exclude from all camps.. .such slaves as" were the rightful property
of Maryland whites, and forcefully reminded Cameron that "it is not the desire of this
• • 21Government to encourage the escape of this species from lawful owners."
Individual slaveholders hired slave-catchers to infiltrate Union regiments around 
Washington and retrieve escaped slaves. However, these ventures were mostly 
unsuccessful; dozens of petitions and angry letters complained that Union troops 
commonly "surrounded" slave-catchers, "menaced them and applied such 
opprobrious epithets, such as Negro stealer and Negro catcher.. .until [they were]
9 9obliged to leave the ground." Another slaveholder complained that his chosen agent 
was violently expelled by Union troops urging their peers to "shoot him, bayonet him,
23kill him, pitch him out!"
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Not all Union regiments were equally welcoming. An abolitionist soldier 
privately questioned his general's tendency to act "in strict conformity with general 
orders"24 by returning escaped slaves, while another general justified his policy of 
capturing and reenslaving all Maryland fugitives by proclaiming that "I care nothing 
for this Devilish Nigger difficulty. I desire to save the union, and will cooperate with
95the Administration m everything tending to that important result."
Unfortunately, the punishment for attempted escape was often devastating. 
One Maryland slave described the beatings administered to two reclaimed fugitives:
They were both taken to the bam and severely whipped. Their clothes were 
raised and tied over their heads to keep their screams from disturbing the 
neighborhood and then were tied up and whipped very severely and then taken 
to jail. (The woman) had a child about nine months old which was taken from
9 f \her and died soon after.
Others were sentenced to lengthy terms in Baltimore Penitentiary, while those who 
were forced back into the dmdgery of field labor were sometimes denied sufficient
97clothing and food.
Despite these risks, slaves continued to flood Union lines outside Washington. 
Able-bodied freedmen built fortifications and cleared roads for the military, while 
women, children, and the elderly were mostly sent to temporary contraband 
settlements in Washington. Indeed, dozens of soldier diaries mention the "exodus of 
contrabands” to the nation's capital, a city that was woefully unprepared to shelter the
9 8large number of freedpeople seeking refuge there. While some able-bodied men 
found work at a Washington naval yard, the vast majority of freedpeople were
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haphazardly shuttled into a series of makeshift camps. Initially, many were crowded 
into unused cells at Old Capital Prison, where conditions were deplorable; witnesses 
found small cells, each occupied by approximately twenty "contrabands half-clad in 
rags," sleeping uncomfortably on the stone floor of the prison.
By late 1861, the prison already held twice its normal capacity, forcing 
government officials to search for new settlements for the overflow of contrabands. 
Newly-appointed Washington contraband superintendent Danforth B. Nichols sent 
many ex-slaves to a building known as Duff Green's Row. There, the contrabands 
were "herded" into several small gender-segregated and insufficiently ventilated 
chambers until a smallpox epidemic devastated the camp in the spring of 1862. 
Nichols also arranged for the construction of several outdoor settlements where most 
freedpeople were squeezed into flimsy tents and shoddy cabins. The one-story cabins 
measured only 120 square feet but frequently housed ten or more freedpeople, an 
unhealthy situation that necessitated "promiscuous herding" and facilitated the deadly 
spread of smallpox. The proliferation of smallpox cases was accelerated by the lack 
of separate bathroom facilities and became so pronounced that justifiably fearful 
Washmgtomans suggested that infected freedpeople be required to post a yellow flag 
outside their tent or cabin. Moreover, the unguarded freedpeople at these outdoor 
camps were vulnerable to both Maryland slave-catchers and military officials who 
often kidnapped unwilling men and forced them into unpaid military labor. Others 
were forcefully "bound out" as domestic servants only to be dismissed after a month 
and denied pay, while freedpeople who actually received fair wages often fell victim
•0 A
to local burglars and ruffians.
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These intolerable conditions did not go unnoticed. Government investigators 
at Old Capitol Prison characterized the camp as "anything but clean and orderly" and 
condescendingly suggested that "the negroes be removed to some place to keep them 
apart from respectable whites."31 Likewise, military officials warned naval Secretary 
Gideon Welles that there were "no longer sufficient accommodations" in the naval
T9 •yard for incoming freedpeople. Washington newspapers reported the horrid 
conditions of camp settlements and alleged that an increasing number of 
impoverished freedpeople were resorting to theft and other crimes.33
While whites selfishly lobbied for the removal of the "undesirable 
contrabands," Washington's liberal reform groups and powerful black community 
supported the construction of a healthy and secure settlement for the benefit of the 
freedpeople. District Superintendent Danforth Nichols acknowledged that contraband 
families wanted to live separately and have their familial bonds maintained rather 
than be grouped with several other families or segregated by sex.34 Washington's 
leading black activists and preachers sent letters and petitions to government officials 
reminding them that "we see [contrabands] in droves every day perambulating the
- 4 . . . ___ j . _  _ 1 _ : ____ 4 .____  1_________ . 1 _______ i _________ j ______________ — j _______________________ , _ _ i ________»»35 t „  a _____ : 1 _ cSuccls ui vv ctSxlmgiuil, numcicss, SnuciCss, uicssiess miu m oneyless. m  01
1862, forty black men signed a petition requesting that "there shall be opened to these
' j / r
colored people a region" outside of Washington. Meanwhile, the Washington 
branch of the National Freedmen Relief Association was formed in 1862 to meet the 
"immediate bodily wants" of the ex-slaves by providing them with necessary 
clothing, blankets, food, and kindling. Likewise, Washington's "well-to-do colored
16
people" formed the Contraband Relief Association to educate the ex-slaves and 
alleviate their physical suffering.
While addressing the immediate concerns of the impoverished contrabands, 
these groups and like-minded missionary associations simultaneously urged the 
federal government to construct a more hospitable settlement featuring adequate 
housing and the opportunity for semi-independent agricultural labor similar to the 
celebrated "free labor" system being utilized on the South Carolina Sea Islands. It 
was in this context that Lieutenant Colonel Elias M. Greene—then working as 
Quartermaster General—suggested that freedpeople be moved onto a settlement on 
Robert E. Lee's estate in Arlington, where "families need not be separated" and 
freedpeople could experience the "salutary effects of pure country air and a return to 
their former healthy avocations as field hands." While Greene acknowledged that the 
move would lead to the "sanitary and moral improvement of the contrabands," he 
tellingly theorized that the camp could "save the government an immense amount of 
money" by employing "the force of contrabands" that had previously been "idle in
n o
this city and a dead weight on the government."
While escaped freedpeople received invaluable aid from sympathetic generals 
and inter-racial support organizations, their own desire for freedom eventually 
produced conditions that led to the founding of the Arlington camp. At the same 
time, however, Elias Greene's statement outlining the potential benefits of Freedmen's 
Village suggested that this "model" settlement might ultimately serve the financial 
interests of the federal government rather than the freedpeople themselves.
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"Every one seems contented, and in a most prosperous condition... Colonel Green has 
provided fo r  the race a miniature city o f  their own, with every auxiliary that can in any manner tend to 
their advancement and happiness ...All o f  them have taken hold o f  their new work with a hearty good
will. The institution is a paying one too!
-Washington Evening Star reporting on Freedmen's Village, December 4, 1863.
"You, not they, will decide when they are to work and when not. Anyone who disobeys will be 
sent to the Guardhouse and fed  only bread and water until they are willing to obey orders."
-J. M. Brown to Mr. G. G. Besley, farm supervisor at Freedmen's Village, December 1864.
The few historians who have examined Freedmen’s Village with a critical eye 
have focused mostly on the post-war administration of the Freedmen's Bureau. 
Consequently, while historians have demonstrated how Freedmen's Village fits within 
the pessimistic post-revisionist narrative of post-war Reconstruction, they have failed 
to thoroughly analyze the structure of the Village during the war itself. In fact, while 
the Village can be called a "model" wartime contraband camp, the restrictive policies 
o f military officials and their refusal to embrace free labor ideology foreshadowed the 
failures o f post-war Reconstruction.
Freedmen's Village was probably destined to become a famous contraband 
settlement. Located just south of Washington and constructed on the grand estate of 
the Confederacy's most famous general, Freedmen's Village quickly became a well- 
known national showcase for government officials seeking to prove that the federal 
government genuinely supported the plight of Southern blacks. Officials deliberately 
invited newspaper reporters to the Village, allowing them to admire the "commodious 
buildings" that housed separate families, the "comfortable" home for the elderly and 
infirm "where every attention (was) paid them by friends of their own color.”
18
Reporters also remarked upon the substantially lower mortality rate o f this "clean and 
prosperous city."
Several wartime government reports revealed a similar enthusiasm for the 
conditions o f the village. The Quartermaster General complimented the "ample 
accommodations" o f the Village hospital in 1863; a year later, he still found the entire 
settlement "clean and well-policed," and theorized that the Village had "saved the 
lives o f hundreds from death and disease." Elias Greene lovingly described the 
Village school run by the American Tract Society, emphasizing the "well-ventilated 
rooms" and "good furniture" that compared favorably with those of "the best common 
schools in the North." Most important, the camp provided "employment for a 
considerable number of men and women not fit" for the brutal physical hardships of 
military labor and armed service. Indeed, the government specifically designed 
Freedmen's Village as a temporary training facility where women, children, and "non- 
able" men would learn the essential values of labor and "self-reliance" while the sick 
and elderly would be cared for at the expense of the government.40
There was a substantial amount of truth in this positive rhetoric; Freedmen's 
Village did indeed feature elements of "a miniature city" based superficially on free 
labor ideology. Black women and "non-able" men independently rented their family 
cabins and cultivated their own agricultural plots for a monthly wage of $10, while 
other adults attended the vocational Industrial School and Village children learned 
literacy and arithmetic at the American Tract Society school. Villagers even paid a 
monthly $5 tax into the "Contraband Fund," which financed the daily rations, 
clothing, and medical care offered at the Village. Thus, the Village resembled a free,
19
self-sustaining community while simultaneously generating surplus food for hungry 
soldiers and hefty financial profits for the government through the imposition of 
monthly $3 rents.41
Wartime conditions at the Village also compared favorably with those in other 
contraband camps nationwide, most notably the remaining settlements in nearby 
urban Washington. Throughout the war, the National Freedmen's Relief Association 
remained justifiably concerned about the "utter destitution" and "bodily physical 
needs" o f Washington contrabands. Their wartime reports overflowed with 
references to the "rags called clothes" freedpeople wore, the drastic need for blankets 
and bedsteads to battle the crippling cold weather and disease, and the meager rations 
of soup the Association was able to provide. Both the NFRA and the Contraband 
Relief Association tried to imitate the successful school system implemented at 
Arlington, but suffered from "a scarcity of school rooms and a want of school 
furniture."42
Other Washington settlements designed specifically for orphaned children 
utilized "badly constructed barracks full o f cracks and holes" that were "fully 
unsuitable for children."42 Freedpeople at the infamous Camp Barker were decimated 
by a smallpox epidemic that routinely killed half a dozen residents each day, a 
condition that was exacerbated by a lack of bedding and the prevalence of clothing 
that inspectors invariably described as "filthy" and "ragged." Overall, mortality 
among Camp Barker contrabands stabilized at about half a dozen deaths per day from 
a fluctuating population that usually ranged from 500 to 700 freedpeople, while
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Freedmen's Village lost only two residents each day from a population that hovered 
between 1, 500 to 2, 200.44
Arlington freedpeople also escaped several o f the hardships that limited the 
freedom of contrabands throughout the South. The Village's fortunate geographic 
proximity to Washington insulated Arlington residents from the ravages and 
disruptions of battle and troop movements that destroyed camps throughout Virginia 
and the Mississippi Valley. Arlington's favorable location also guaranteed a fairly 
consistent military presence that prevented the widespread slave-catching and 
reenslavement that freedpeople in less secure areas faced. Furthermore, a contraband 
camp adjacent to Washington on Robert E. Lee's estate almost naturally became a 
publicity magnet that pragmatic government officials could advance as a "model" 
camp. Finally, the lack of a large nearby Unionist slave-holding class initially held 
off the emergence of a contract labor system like those implemented in loyal areas 
such as Virginia's Eastern Shore and in occupied regions like Louisiana and various 
locations in the Mississippi basin that fell under the control o f Ulysses S. Grant's
45army.
Despite these crucial benefits, Freedmen's Village never developed into a truly 
autonomous experiment in free labor; historians who have emphasized the 
conservative nature of post-war Reconstruction under the Freedmen's Bureau at 
Arlington could readily root their findings in the limited version of "freedom" that 
emerged during the war itself. Indeed, immediately upon the Village’s establishment, 
the army officials and camp superintendents in charge of the Village ignored free 
labor ideology entirely by instituting a restrictive wage labor system designed
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primarily to exploit black labor for the benefit of the federal government and the 
Union army. Wages were entirely non-negotiable. Freedpeople received a monthly 
wage of $10, $5 of which was automatically funneled into the expanding Contraband 
Fund. Meanwhile, black families were required to supply a monthly rent of $3, 
leaving the majority of laborers with a perilously scanty income.
Moreover, Villagers exercised minimal control over the labor process; 
agricultural workers were often forcibly removed from their farms and employed as 
street-sweepers or "whitewashers" in Washington. Likewise, Arlington military 
officials displayed a disturbing tendency to spontaneously remove freedpeople and 
coerce them into cleaning hospital cesspools and toilets and digging graves at the 
National Cemetery at Arlington.46 Sporadic military impressment also limited 
freedom at the Village. The few able-bodied men residing in Arlington were "for 
months exceedingly annoyed" by Union troops who entered the camp "under various 
false pretences, such as visiting friends and relatives," only to "indiscriminately" 
apprehend freedpeople and force them into military service. Ironically, the most 
devastating act of impressment was committed by members of a black regiment who 
were offered a profitable bounty payment for each freedman they were able to 
"enlist."47
On the "autonomous" farms themselves, the army and the War Department 
employed white "overseers" and sternly reminded them that "you, not [the 
freedpeople] will decide when they are to work and when not!" Any freedperson 
guilty of disobeying an overseer was immediately imprisoned in the Village 
guardhouse and fed only "bread and water until they [were] willing to obey orders."48
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Furthermore, Village superintendent Danforth B. Nichols was notorious among the
freedpeople because o f his penchant for violence and abuse. Village resident Lewis
Johnson testified that
A woman in camp had a little child; Nichols told [the woman] she must go to 
work and she told him she was not ready to go to work; he told her she was 
and that she must do so; the woman did not go to work, so Mr. Nichols beat 
the woman out the camp with one of the soldier's sword canes and his fist. I 
can not tell the number of persons he used to abuse, but there were a great
49many.
By mid-1864, Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs admitted that 
Village farming "was done by women and the infirm" but defended this policy by 
asserting that farming "does not require strength of hand." Moreover, freedpeople 
were specifically prohibited from selling their farm products, since the Village's 
agricultural produce was mostly reserved for Union troops. Furthermore, mobility 
was severely circumscribed; artisans and farmers were not permitted to travel to 
nearby markets in Washington and Alexandria without a pass issued by the Village 
Superintendent, a luxury that was seldom granted.50
In an effort to obtain their version of freedom, Village blacks consistently 
protested these restrictive policies favored by army officials. Freedpeople repeatedly 
questioned the propriety of the Contraband Fund and the Village's steep rents. Many 
women professed their inability to afford the rent and taxation, accurately claiming 
that their husbands' military labor frequently went unpaid. One Village woman 
indignantly informed a camp superintendent that "I give up my child upon the word 
and honor of this government to go and tote his musket and he had gone and lost his 
life. I think Sir that is enough."51 Village farmers also illegally sold and traded crops 
and other marketable goods to local residents, a commonplace violation of Village
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policy that elicited several angry official documents reminding Village guards to
"stop any peddlers about Freedmen's Village from selling or buying clothing and
rags" and other practical necessities such as stoves, farm produce, and beds.52
Most important, Village blacks vehemently protested against the irrational and
violent punishments meted out by Superintendent Danforth Nichols, an effort that led
to Nichols's dismissal. In the most infamous case of physical abuse, Lucy Ellen
Johnson testified that
[Nichols and his guards] fastened a rope around my two thumbs and passing it 
over the limb of a tree raised me from the ground so that my weight was 
suspended by the thumbs.. .They then took it off and tied it on my wrist—again 
raising me as before with arms outstretched and without any power to relieve 
myself—In this position one kicked me, another choked my throat, another 
stuffed dirty wool in my mouth. After nearly half an hour they released me 
and (Nichols) advised me to leave the camp.
Nichols apparently beat and abused Johnson simply because she requested her daily
rations despite suffering from an illness that had prevented her from farming that day,
and because she was married to a military laborer whose wages (which she had not
53yet received) theoretically should have been used to purchase sufficient food.
Unfortunately, Lucy Johnson was not alone; a black shoemaker named Henry 
Cook expressed his desire to market his goods in Washington rather than perform 
monotonous agricultural labor by telling an overseer, "I was a free man and could do 
what I pleased." The next day, the overseer demanded retribution for this "uppity" 
remark: "You damn nigger you come out here and God damn if you don't I will kill 
you with this stick!" Cook obeyed and was struck in the head, the blow sending him 
sprawling to the ground. The guard pinned Cook down and "began to pound me in 
my head and face with his fist, and then just took his two thumbs and commenced to
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gouge right into my eyes and tried to gouge them out." Cook was hospitalized for 
two weeks following the beating, and upon his release was immediately dismissed 
from the Village for refusing to perform the mandated agricultural labor.54 
Meanwhile, several frightened freedpeople testified that Nichols's rage resulted from 
his excessive drinking, while another tellingly stated that "My master was a first rate 
m an.. .1 would rather be under him by ten degrees than be with Nichols."55
Enough damning evidence was compiled to justify transferring Nichols away 
from Freedmen's Village, but overall, freedpeople were unsuccessful in their attempts 
to create an independent free labor community. While Freedmen's Village remained 
substantially safer and healthier than the vast majority of Union contraband camps, its 
residents were never truly "contented" or "delighted," and the Village itself never 
resembled "a miniature city" or a semi-autonomous community o f free laborers. 
Throughout the war, Village officials were primarily motivated by military and 
financial concerns rather than by any allegiance to free labor or sympathy for the 
struggling freedmen. Consequently, they implemented a closely monitored and 
controlled wage labor process designed to fatten the federal budget, feed Union 
soldiers, and transform the "mass" of "idle" freedmen who would otherwise become a 
"dead weight on the government" into profit-making laborers.
Indeed, throughout the war, physical conditions deteriorated and labor policies 
became increasingly restrictive. The initial spaciousness and low mortality rates of 
Freedmen's Village actually undermined its long-term potential; the contrast between 
conditions at Arlington and those in the District quickly became so blatant that the 
government relocated thousands of suffering Washington contrabands to Freedmen's
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Village throughout the duration of the war. The largest single transfer involved the 
Camp Barker freedpeople, who arrived at the Village in January of 1864 in "a most 
destitute and uncleanly condition," looking "shamelessly wretched," with many 
residents "fatally ill with small pox." Disgusted and sympathetic onlookers described 
a depressing mass of "poorly clad, filthy contrabands destitute of necessary bedding" 
and wearing "barely enough clothing to preserve decency." In an observation that 
revealed the superior conditions o f Freedmen's Village even as it foreshadowed the 
imminent decline in those conditions, H. E. Simmons (an inspector from the Office of 
the Quartermaster General) remarked that at Arlington, "[the contrabands] are neat, 
tidy, and very comfortable, while [at Camp Barker] they were dirty, discontented, and 
uncomfortable. "56
Dozens of destitute Washington wives of black soldiers and military laborers 
also sought and gained admission to Freedmen's Village throughout the war. Women 
whose distant husbands earned unreliable army wages were often left to provide for 
children without a dependable income of their own. When these District women sank 
into poverty and starvation, they frequently applied for government rations and 
financial assistance. The government's response became predictable: "I have no 
authority to simply provide rations for wives o f colored soldiers and teamsters— 
recommend they apply to Freedmen's Village instead." This policy strengthened 
gender hierarchies within the black community; black women were increasingly seen 
as helpless dependents, while black men were offered more lucrative jobs in the 
public sphere. Indeed, as the war proceeded, Freedmen’s Village essentially became a 
refuge for elderly men, children, and women who were deemed unfit for military
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service and labor; by 1865, women constituted over 75 percent of the Village's "able- 
bodied" population.57
This incoming population compromised the previously healthy physical 
conditions at Freedmen's Village. Since the original Villagers occupied the coveted
cabins, military officials initially housed the Washington newcomers in crowded
*
outdoor tents that lacked sufficient bedding material and blankets. These lamentable 
conditions and the harsh winter weather combined to kill many of the new Villagers, 
especially the elderly and those who slept directly on the frigid ground. Not 
surprisingly, the new residents accelerated the spread of smallpox throughout the 
Village and introduced a series of other deadly diseases that were "contracted in the 
move from the city," including scarlet fever and whooping cough.
The influx of freedpeople also produced a crucial shift in Village labor policy. 
Since the Village could not feasibly hold the expanding population, military 
supervisors decided to deviate from their initial vision of Freedmen's Village as a 
profitable experiment in controlled agricultural labor and transformed the Village into 
a temporary depot for potential dependent laborers and domestic servants who could 
be contractually "bound out" to private employers throughout the country. This labor 
policy would be accelerated after 1865 by the Freedmen's Bureau, but it began in 
earnest during the wartime administration, a critical issue of timing that has been 
overlooked by historians who mistakenly portray wartime Village policy as static. 
Indeed, by mid-1864, the military had already transformed nearby Mason's (now 
Roosevelt's) Island into a temporary holding ground for those Village residents most 
likely to be hired by the private employers who visited the island.
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Though the contract system substituted private wage labor for publicly 
monitored work, the practical results o f this change for freedpeople were minimal. 
Military and Bureau officials simply kicked contrabands out of the Village and forced 
them to sign restrictive one-year contracts with local planters. As a result, 
freedpeople were robbed of any opportunity for economic advancement and instead 
placed against their will into positions of economic dependency under racist Southern 
planters.
Investigators from the Inspector General’s Office found the conditions at 
Mason’s Island quite appalling— especially compared with conditions in the original 
Village. Freedpeople were "promiscuously herded" into crowded military barracks, 
the island's water supply was dangerously low, and the inspectors complained of 
rapidly spreading disease, the "entire absence of proper drainage," and the disgusting 
and unsanitary "accumulation of garbage" on the island. A restrictive pass system 
also limited geographic mobility.59
More distressing to military officers on the island was the fact that interested 
employers initially refused to hire Island freedpeople, since most were "women with 
small children" or "too old for usefulness." Consequently, army officers and newly- 
hired Island Superintendent Danforth B. Nichols (quickly rehired after his initial 
dismissal) took a more forceful and direct role in contract labor negotiations. A 
second (and equally outraged) investigator from the Inspector’s Office noted that 
Nichols and his advisors endeavored to "get rid of [the freedpeople] in any way, often 
by throwing them upon the community at large." Nichols convinced the government
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to print hundreds of identical apprenticeship and labor contracts that required only the
signature o f an Island official. A typical contract was frighteningly simple:
Elias Greene, Chief Quartermaster of the Department of Washington, has
placed and bound out as an apprentice_________ to learn the trade of
________ until_______.
Labor contracts were identical and almost always included the obligation that
freedpeople and employers contract "for not less than one year." A few contracts
required employers to "comfortably maintain and properly treat" their charges, and
also warned that reports o f "abuse and misuse" would result in the termination of the
contract, though it is unclear how thoroughly officials enforced these requirements.60
However, island officials apparently bound out freedpeople with minimal
judgment or concern for their financial and physical well-being. From July 1864 to
March 1865, the permanent population of both Freedmen's Village and Mason's
Island dropped precipitously: the number of freedpeople in Arlington declined from
2, 200 to 1,400 over this eight-month period; that of Mason's Island fell from 1, 200
to 500.61 Moreover, with the exception of a few domestic servants hired by wealthy
Northern families, the large majority o f black apprentices and farmers were
contracted to nearby Maryland and Virginia planters, often with disastrous results.
One man returned to Freedmen's Village and testified that his employer "picked up
some bricks, beat him upon the head, knocked him down, cut him with an axe, and
cowhided him" after a dispute over wages. Another Mason's Island ffeedman
reported that after three months of plantation labor, "he was driven off without any
f\0pay," while several parents helplessly objected to the apprenticing of their children.
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Freedpeople resisted these changes in a variety of ways. As noted above, 
several left their private employers and returned to Arlington requesting a more 
equitable employment situation or permanent status as Village farmers. Skilled 
freedpeople seeking to avoid contract labor simply left the Village and opened 
individual or cooperative shops in Washington, while others found paying jobs in 
District warehouses, hospitals, hotels, and restaurants.
Most important, Village residents who dreaded both oppressive contract labor 
and a return to economic stagnation in Washington steadfastly refused to leave the 
relatively healthy and stable Village. One army official on Mason’s Island claimed 
that the deplorable conditions there were actually "good because it would be harder to 
get [the freedpeople] to leave for service if they were at Freedmen's Village, because 
there they have comfortable houses to live in and therefore most of those negroes are 
unwilling to go out to service." Likewise, Elias Greene complained that "freedmen 
cannot be induced to take service with private farms and endeavor to return to
/TO
Freedmen's Village." Though the Village proper was no free labor paradise, 
Arlington freedmen decided early-on that they preferred the stability and pseudo­
independence of renting and farming government land to the "freedom" of the private 
"free labor" economy.
Thus, despite idealistic government and newspaper rhetoric, Freedmen’s 
Village was never an idyllic free labor paradise where freedpeople “delighted” in the 
“pure country air” and could be seen “working as free men and women.” The Village 
itself was nothing more than an exploitative labor camp erected mostly because 
military officials had to do something with a growing number of freedpeople who
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could not (initially) be foisted upon local planters. When that solution became 
insufficient and the Village became overcrowded, military officials resorted to the 
solution used throughout the occupied South: forced contract labor. Both policies 
were designed with government self-interest in mind, and both worked against the 
wishes of Arlington freedpeople who sought economic independence and land 
ownership.
Thus, contemporaries who idealized the Village's wartime conditions and 
historians who have made similar errors or focused almost exclusively on the postwar 
administration of the Freedmen's Bureau have ignored the total inapplicability of free 
labor ideology in wartime Arlington. Likewise, historians have not provided a 
thorough analysis of the decidedly conservative education provided by American 
Tract Society missionaries.
****
"You must think o f  these things, and think kindly o f  your old master. You have grown up with him, it 
may be, on the same plantation. Do not fa ll out now, but join  your interests i f  you can, and live and
die together."
-Plain Counsels for Freedmen. a textbook published by the American Tract Society
"Don't refuse to work then, even at low wages. Work at low wage is better than idleness."
-Friendly Counsels for Freedmen. a textbook published by the American Tract Society
The few historians who have examined Freedmen's Village briefly mention 
the existence of a missionary school; a couple join Village officials in celebrating the 
"commodious" buildings and the "good furniture" that separated Village schools from 
other facilities that used dilapidated church basements or tiny military barracks.64 
However, historians have overlooked the conservative and paternalistic tone of Tract 
Society education that focused on moral reformation and attempted to discourage
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blacks from pursuing economic gain. Indeed, the educational philosophy of the Tract 
Society dovetailed nicely with the economic beliefs of Village officials, a unique 
occurrence that allowed Tract Society missionaries to operate with an unprecedented 
degree o f independence. While the Sea Island "Gideonites" and liberal American 
Missionary Association teachers in the Mississippi Valley often clashed with 
meddlesome military supervisors and local planters, there is no record of any similar 
ideological disputes at Freedmen's Village.65
Given the Tract Society's historical background, this unique rapport with 
conservative government officials is not surprising. In 1825, members o f the New 
York and New England Tract Societies decided to combine their efforts by forming 
the American Tract Society and moving its headquarters to the heart of Manhattan. 
The Tract Society was strictly non-partisan and its members devoted themselves 
solely to the distribution of religious or religious-themed tracts by authors as diverse 
as Jonathan Edwards and Lewis Tappan.
Though the Society aimed to convert America’s downtrodden immigrants and 
freedpeople, the ATS kept a safe distance from the abolitionist movement.
Throughout the contentious 1850s, the Society's publishing committee staunchly 
refused to publish any tracts critical of slavery, since the Society's Constitution 
specified that tracts must be "calculated to receive the approbation of all evangelical
f\f\ •Christians," including Southern slaveholders. However, by 1857, slavery agitation 
in Kansas and Nebraska motivated radical members of the Society to lobby for a tract 
outlining the "moral evils of slavery." The result was the ambivalent "Duties of 
Masters," which supported the South's peculiar institution but encouraged
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paternalistic masters to treat slaves humanely and provided masters with advisory 
chapters regarding "the correction of servants when they go amiss." Moderate 
Society members were uncomfortable with the "radical" tone of the tract, while 
abolitionist members o f the AMA and American Antislavery Society labeled the ATS
/ro
an "enemy of liberty, and the bulwark of oppression."
Internal strife between conservatives and moderate anti-slavery members 
culminated at the Society's annual meeting in 1858, where a few inflammatory 
abolitionist speeches further divided the ATS. After the convention, the organization 
split into two factions based mostly on the slavery issue. However, the two Tract 
Societies were not drastically different; money and members overlapped between the 
two, and the "anti-slavery" Boston society continually displeased abolitionist groups 
by trumpeting Union and the preservation of "the best government God ever made" as 
the primary goals of the Civil War while failing to embrace the Emancipation 
Proclamation.69
Given this moderate background, it is not surprising that paternalistic 
moralism defined the educational philosophy of Tract Society teachers and schools.
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since "Some o f your people who have comfortable clothing, when they get a little
money, go and spend it for more clothes that look a little nicer, so that they can make
7n
a fine show at Church." Textbooks with condescending titles like Advice to 
Freedmen and Plain Counsels fo r  Freedmen were largely devoted to religious and 
ethical lessons. Popular texts reminded freedpeople that they must "be truthful and 
honest," that "one of the greatest failings of your people is a want of punctuality," that
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• 7 1drinking alcohol was a terrible sin, and that cleanliness was an important virtue. 
These moral exhortations were supplemented with spelling lessons, arithmetic 
primers, and rudimentary biological descriptions of various animals. Only the most 
advanced textbook (Lydia Maria Child's The Freedmen's Book) contained somewhat 
sophisticated biographies of black historical figures, while the most commonly 
published and distributed teaching materials were mostly moralistic and contained 
few other educational lessons. Indeed, even The Freedmen's Spelling Book and the 
various Freedman's Readers featured a mixture of standard educational lessons and 
"temperance songs," Biblical anecdotes, and lists of sins to be avoided.72
Weekly and monthly Tract newspapers and pamphlets distributed at the 
Village carried similar messages. The Freedman's Journal and The Freedman's 
Advocate typically devoted a single page of each issue to basic math and spelling 
lessons, reserving the several remaining pages for Biblical stories about "The 
Prodigal Son" and other topics and written lectures about "thrift," prayer, and the 
importance of stabilized, legal marriages. Interestingly, even the spelling lessons 
sometimes focused on words like "divine" and "omnipotent," and a copy of the Ten
73Commandments appeared regularly m each publication. Even visiting teacner ana 
famous charity worker Sojourner Truth publicly ordered Arlington freedpeople to "be 
clean, for cleanliness is next to godliness," chastised them for "living in disgrace off 
the government," and privately complained that the freedpeople were "very ignorant 
in relation to house-keeping" and sorely lacked "industry" and "independence."74
Though these exhortations on work ethic and moral virtue were common 
among most abolitionists, the Tract Society’s theories of labor and economics
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remained relatively conservative. Though Tract Society teachers did not actively
coerce Arlington freedpeople into signing contracts or laboring for the government
(as did military and Bureau officials), their teaching philosophies lent tacit approval
to the government policy of forcing freedpeople to reside (permanently) on the
bottom rung of Virginia’s economic ladder. Textbooks emphasized "the importance
of complying strictly with your contracts," and several textbooks and pamphlets
reminded freedpeople that "the greater part of the freedmen will employ themselves
in farming. We think of them as plowing, sowing, planting, hoeing, weeding,
digging, haying, and harvesting." Most tellingly, Tract Society missionaries openly
encouraged freedpeople to sign labor contracts with ex-masters, even when
contractual terms seemed unfavorable. Missionaries attempted to assuage black fears
by assuring freedpeople that they "should have confidence in masters" and that they
"need not be afraid to sign any contract which a master will sign first."75
Missionaries also advised freedpeople on the importance o f avoiding
economic self-interest:
Some of you may object to signing contracts because you think you ought to 
have m ore.. .Had freedom come to you at the beginning of the year, the 
planter could have done much more for you. You could have raised more 
com, could have raised even a fine crop of cotton to help both you and the 
planter. But, your freedom came too late for this, so you must now make the 
best of it; you can try to do better for next year.
Another textbook simply reminded freedpeople not to "refuse to work, even at low
7 fswages. Work at low wages is better than idleness."
Thus, Tract Society missionaries and Village officials each defined black 
freedom in very limited terms; freedpeople were intended for subordinate agricultural 
labor governed by restrictive contracts and overseen by planters. This conservative
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educational philosophy conflicted with the more traditional ideological basis of 
District schools administered by the AMA and the National Freedmen’s Relief 
Association, which offered "a thorough English and classical education" equivalent to
7 7that "taught in our best Academies."
Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to know how Village blacks 
responded to Tract Society teachings. School attendance was apparently exemplary 
among both adults and children, declining only as the overall population of the 
Village decreased beginning in mid-1864. While Village blacks were undoubtedly 
eager to obtain much-needed literacy, they simultaneously expressed their rejection of 
the limited Tract Society version of "freedom" in their determined efforts to acquire 
the benefits of liberty and free labor. Many Arlington freedpeople also ignored 
missionary lectures on the importance of documented legal marriage; missionaries 
and teachers constantly criticized the tendency of Village men and women to "take 
up" with each other in "promiscuous" common law marriages. Although the effect of 
Tract Society philosophy on the minds of black students is impossible to ascertain, 
historians who have blindly celebrated the spacious Tract Society school and the 
"eagerness" of Arlington’s black students have overlooked the Society’s rejection of 
free labor ideology and the limited model of freedom that the Society’s missionaries
70
and textbooks proposed.
"She is a woman o f disreputable character, and o f  that class o f  women here who entertains 
the idea that freedom means to do and say what they please. This woman, having been acting 
disgracefully, and the reason I  p laced  her in the guardhouse was that she told me that I  had no control 
over her actions that she was free, and could and would do as she pleased. "
-Village superintendent describing Village resident Caroline Shelton, April 1867.
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Though previous historians have focused almost exclusively on the 
conservative nature of Freedmen's Bureau policy at the Village, Bureau officials 
simply accelerated the already ongoing process of removing Village freedpeople by 
encouraging them to sign private labor contracts or evicting them from the Village 
with little prior notice. However, the Bureau devised harsher and more effective 
means for accomplishing this goal. Bureau officials supplemented a more thorough 
contract labor system by intentionally eliminating the physical and environmental 
advantages of the Village. First, Village superintendents demanded that nearly 
- everyone perform mandatory agricultural labor; many elderly and infirm patients 
were removed from the Home and hospital and forced into field labor, and several 
handicapped and crippled residents had their labor exemptions revoked. Freedpeople 
claiming that their physical disabilities or age prevented them from performing 
mandated labor and chores were summarily evicted. Government officials also fired 
and evicted freedpeople who had previously served as paid hospital laborers and 
"washerwomen," while those lucky enough to retain their non-agricultural jobs and 
residences worked without remuneration.
By the end of 1866, wages for all agricultural laborers were eliminated, and 
daily food rations were cut in half. In addition, Bureau officials suddenly demanded 
that all rent payments be submitted one week prior to the first of each month, a policy 
that seemed unreasonable to freedpeople who no longer received regular wages and 
often had to wait for months until distant husbands and fathers were able to send a 
portion of their military wages. Those who failed to furnish the appropriate rent 
payments faced immediate eviction.79
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The Bureau also allowed the physical conditions of the Village to deteriorate. 
.By late 1866, Bureau investigators sympathetic toward the freedpeople reported that 
Village residents could only make a "scanty living," and that the Village cabins were 
"exceedingly filthy" and suffered from leaky roofs and a disagreeable odor. Bureau 
investigators also declared that Village privies were "unfit for use," and noted that the 
Home for the aged and infirm was becoming notorious for its "insufficient 
accommodations and heating." Inspectors found that "all the heating stoves are 
broken and worthless," forcing "uncomfortable" residents o f the Home to "huddle 
over" the single functioning stove. Consequently, mortality rates among infants and 
elderly Villagers increased markedly beginning in 1866, while Mason's Island
OA
remained a deplorable haven for disease, crowding, and high mortality rates.
Though a few Bureau officials and investigators tried their best to expose the 
new rigid policies and declining conditions at the Village, they amounted to a tiny 
faction whose bureaucratic whistle-blowing could not overcome the widely-held 
desire to dismantle the Village. Indeed, despite these reports, Bureau officials in 
Arlington continued the effort to eliminate the black "financial burden" by relocating 
freedpeople on nearby plantations without regard for their physical safety or financial 
well-being. One Bureau official declared that "blacks should go back into the 
country, both in Virginia and Maryland, to find work!"81 Like their wartime 
predecessors, Bureau agents in Alexandria County and Mason's Island forced 
freedpeople to sign labor contracts with local planters. Records from Mason's Island 
indicate that laborers and apprentices invariably found work with planters (often 
former slaveowners) in Maryland and Virginia, and that the majority (over 85
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percent) o f contracted adults were women, many of them separated from their 
children. Mothers with infants and dependent children were usually "unable to obtain
jobs" and were either evicted or left to "live in rags" on Mason's Island until more
82generous employers arrived.
Letters and petitions sent to the Bureau by contracted workers reveal that 
Virginia and Maryland employers were unwilling to provide freedpeople with the 
benefits and liberties ideally associated with free labor. Several ex-Villagers received 
scanty wages of $8 or less per month, while others were dismissed without payment. 
When one freedman inquired about unpaid wages, his employer "knocked him down 
with the back of an axe" and informed the worker that his wages were being withheld 
because "he was not in the fields early enough." An unlucky apprentice revealed
QA
that he was "treated badly, whipped, and ill-fed," while another freedman working 
in Maryland complained "of not receiving any compensation for my services—no
Q f
clothing, no chance for school—nothing but whippings." The same man also 
claimed that he was "struck with a shovel, injuring my head very badly" after he was
unable to repair a broken cooking stove. A group of Village freedpeople "bound out"
86to Arkansas planters endured similar hardships.
Freedpeople did not passively submit to these efforts to remove them from the 
Village. Led by black Village preacher Robert Laws, Arlington freedpeople fiercely 
protested the new harsh work orders and widespread evictions. Residents held a 
series o f conventions during which they labeled the Bureau a collection of 
"copperheads" who "took all our wages away" and unfairly reduced rations to a 
dangerously low level. Laws and several other respected black leaders denounced the
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Bureau for "turning us out as if we were brutes," and pointedly reminded Bureau 
officials that "women who have lost husbands and sons to the causes of liberty and 
Civil War are being evicted!" Individual freedpeople criticized the Bureau for 
"requiring those who are too much incapacitated to do work they can't perform," 
while Laws and other literate leaders wrote petitions on behalf of those who had been 
"put out of doors" and had their "furniture thrown in the street" for failing to submit 
rent payments in advance. Petitions and letters of complaint poignantly related 
stories o f "old people here thrown out in the cold" without "even a shirt to their 
name."87
Most importantly, Village residents boldly staked their claim to independent 
land ownership rights. Reverend Laws encouraged his followers to petition Congress 
for permanent residency at the Village, reminding listeners that their rent payments 
and monthly contributions to the Contraband Fund had "built this [camp]." Villagers 
urged Congress to allow "us to judge who should stay and be removed," and Laws 
and a group of petitioners informed Congress that "you need not find [Village 
freedpeople] one ration or clothe [sic]," and that Villagers were prepared for Congress 
to "rest some of the responsibilities on US!" Meanwhile, the few able-bodied 
residents who had accumulated significant incomes successfully convinced Bureau 
officials to lease 280 acres of Village farmland to residents willing to pay $1 per acre. 
A few dozen families thus became semi-independent leaseholders, while many of the 
evicted freedpeople built shanties and cultivated abandoned land located just outside
• R Qthe boundaries of the Village.
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Many freedpeople simply continued to avoid the contract system entirely. 
Government officials admitted that "by far the greatest difficulty is between freedmen 
and white people relating to contracts and arises often from there being no settled and 
definite contracts m ade.. .Freedmen apparently receive ideas that are entirely different 
from what was intended." Thus, many literate freedmen simply refused to participate 
in any contractual agreements, while others were allowed to reenter Freedmen's 
Village after government inquiries revealed "deliberate intention on the part of some 
employers to swindle them."
Black leaders also circumvented the Bureau's contract system by privately 
negotiating with Northern employers who needed domestic servants and laborers.90 
Thus, Rev. Laws often traveled to Connecticut and Massachusetts with Village 
residents seeking employment, while Sojourner Truth found several families in 
upstate New York who could provide "good places" and fair wage rates for black 
women and children. Overall, those Villagers fortunate enough to find employment 
in the Northeast seem to have fared better than their counterparts in the South, but at 
least one freedman returned from Tarrytown, New York, after his designated family 
"had no place to put him."91
In their efforts to become independent landowners and avoid unfair labor 
contracts, Village blacks articulated their own alternative version of freedom, one that 
was very different than the "freedom" proposed by Village officials and local 
planters. Blacks envisioned a post-slavery economy based on independence and land 
ownership. By rejecting dependent contractual relationships and agitating for 
permanent Village residency, Arlington freedpeople staked their claim to economic
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independence and tried to create a self-sufficient agricultural community that could 
exist somewhat separately from the broader wage-based market economy.
These efforts were at best only partially successful. While a minority of 
Bureau officials questioned the "unnecessary severity of the order that all 
unemployed must leave" and opposed the evictions of those who were unable to pay 
rent in advance, Village policy remained essentially unchanged throughout 1867. 
The unemployed continued to be evicted, rations were never increased, wage labor 
was entirely eliminated, and advance rent payment remained a prerequisite for 
continued residency. In addition, Rev. Laws was deemed an unwanted agitator and 
expelled from the Village in early 1867, robbing the freedpeople of their most 
respected and influential leader. Those enterprising freedpeople who constructed 
their own shanties and farms beyond the boundaries of the Village proper were 
removed to Washington to fend for themselves and had their houses destroyed.
Sensing the hopelessness o f their existence in Arlington, many freedpeople 
voluntarily left, moving to nearby Washington or resigning themselves to a year of 
contract labor under a local planter.94
As the black population dwindled throughout 1867 and the Freedmen's 
Bureau neared expiration, the government moved to dismantle the Village entirely, 
threatening to sell the buildings and evict the remaining freedpeople, a group 
composed of able-bodied leaseholders and their families. In a last-ditch effort to 
acquire some semblance of true land ownership, these freedpeople appealed for a 
delay and eventually convinced federal officials to extend their leases for two 
additional years. When those leases finally expired in 1870, the government refused
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to renew them but allowed the freedpeople to remain settled on the Arlington estate 
on the condition that "they are to acquire no title to the land and are to move when 
required." Under these terms, the freedpeople lived relatively unmolested until the 
early 1880s, when a series of legal cases and property disputes began which resulted 
in their official expulsion in 1900, though most of the remaining freedpeople vacated 
the Village during the 1890s. While the ex-"contrabands" and their descendants were 
ultimately compensated for the value of their dwellings and their earlier contributions 
to the long-defunct Contraband Fund, their final eviction merely highlighted their 
continued inability to achieve true freedom and independence.95
The post-war story of Arlington freedmen paralleled that of freedmen 
throughout the South. For the majority o f Village blacks, postwar Reconstruction 
administered by the Freedmen's Bureau produced an incomplete version of freedom 
that failed to satisfy their desire for land ownership and economic independence.
Like freedpeople throughout most of the South, Villagers were either left to fend for 
themselves without a sufficient economic foundation or coerced into signing 
restrictive one-year contracts that left them landless and vulnerable to oppressive and 
unreasonable white planters.
This was not simply a postbellum phenomenon; Freedmen's Village had never 
developed into an idyllic community of independent laborers, and wartime military 
officials and Village superintendents never embraced or even applied free labor 
ideology at the Village itself. Motivated primarily by budgetary concerns and their 
fears that freedpeople would constitute a financially burdensome population, Village
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officials designed a "profitable” system at the expense of the long-term economic 
well-being o f the freedmen, who were denied sufficient wages, economic 
independence, and land ownership.
Reporters, government officials, and modem historians who celebrated the 
wartime "golden age" of Freedmen's Village have overlooked the extremely low 
wages, exorbitant rent charges, harsh restrictions on mobility, and verbal and physical 
abuse that circumscribed the black "freedom" that emerged in Arlington from 1863 to 
1865. Indeed, while the Village certainly deserved praise for its relatively healthy 
and sanitary physical conditions, its labor policies resembled those of less celebrated 
camps where blacks were denied land ownership and control over the labor process 
itself. Freedmen's Village officials refused to emulate the more liberal labor 
experiments utilized on the South Carolina Sea Islands and Davis Bend plantation.
The overcrowding of the Village after 1863 resulted in the development o f a 
repressive contract labor system that usually placed freedpeople in dependent 
economic positions—a scenario that became the hallmark of postwar Reconstmction. 
Consequently, the Village more accurately fits the "halfway house" concept proposed 
by Louis Gerteis and other historians; Arlington freedpeople successfully struggled to 
eradicate the vestiges o f chattel slavery, but were unable to obtain the full benefits of 
liberty and free labor. Despite the determined efforts of freedpeople who sought their 
own version of freedom, government policy at Freedmen's Village and Mason's 
Island anticipated the tragic failures o f post-war Reconstmction throughout the South.
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Chapter 2: "Negroes are Hired Out for Merely a Pittance": Contract Labor on
the Eastern Shore
"[Residents o f  the Eastern Shore] think i f  we go among them it will be to steal and 
emancipate their negroes. When these apprehensions are corrected the reaction in our favor must be
great."
-Major General John A. Dix, president o f the Union Defense Committee, November 8,
1861.96
At the outset o f the Civil War, Union officials handled potentially secessionist 
slaveholders on Virginia’s Eastern Shore with caution, hoping to secure a teetering 
Unionist region that would help guarantee the tenuous loyalty of neighboring 
Maryland. This cautious and pragmatic approach would define the federal 
government's "contraband" policy along the Eastern Shore; while Union officials 
willingly confiscated abandoned land for contraband agricultural settlements in 
openly disloyal regions, the overriding aim of preserving fragile Shore Unionism 
prevented similar developments in Northampton and Accomac counties.
Thus, while freedpeople in mainland Freedmen's Village, the Mississippi 
Valley, and the South Carolina Sea Islands labored on temporary agricultural 
settlements under varying degrees o f freedom, Shore freedpeople were almost 
immediately forced into private contract labor in order to please local white 
employers. Shore freedpeople became some of the first to experience the limits of 
post-emancipation economic "freedom" as defined by oppressive private contracts 
and limited government intervention.
45
Interaction between federal officials and Shore residents began in late 1861, 
when worried Union officials took notice o f increased secessionist activity on the 
Shore. In several letters written during the summer of 1861, Major General John A. 
Dix warned his superiors of "a camp of secessionists, variously estimated from one 
thousand to three thousand men" on the Shore. Dix worried that the well-organized 
and heavily armed secessionists were becoming "active and confident," and 
complained that Shore Unionists were "discontented and to some extent depressed." 
Most important, Dix worried that the loss o f Virginia's Eastern Shore (still nominally 
Unionist) would jeopardize the loyalty of Maryland. Dix repeatedly warned Lincoln's 
closest advisors that "the Eastern Shore o f Maryland [is] in great danger," that it was 
"defenseless," and that local Maryland Unionists were "unable to arrest the 
secessionists that are now passing in great numbers through that section to the Eastern 
Shore of Virginia, where the Confederates are getting together a pretty formidable 
force."97
For the excitable Dix, Virginia's Eastern Shore was the linchpin of Unionism 
in the Chesapeake; the fall of Northampton and Accomac to secessionism would lead 
to the loss of an already divided Maryland, and, ultimately, the defeat of the Union 
cause. Dix urged Union officials to take action. For months, Dix sent apocalyptic 
letters to Secretary of War Simon Cameron, General George McClellan, and several 
other Union officials, recommending that "three or four regiments.. .be sent [to the 
Eastern Shore].. .to break up this camp of secessionists.. .The exhibition of such a 
force and the destruction of the secession camp would have a salutary effect 
throughout the Eastern Shore of Maryland and Virginia." After a few months of
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military inaction, Dix again suggested that "there be prompt and decisive action.. .It is 
extremely desirable to have a decided demonstration of force [on the Eastern Shore] 
by the 1st o f November...,” he continued. “The election in this State comes off on 
the 6th, and our Union friends in [Northampton and Accomac counties] are
QQ
disheartened and in danger of being overawed by .. .these rebel organizations."
Though the upcoming elections were merely contests for the usual local and , 
county posts, they were nonetheless crucial, since they were largely contested 
between unionist and secessionist candidates seeking to control the politics and courts 
of the Shore, not to mention the overall tenor of Shore life. With such high stakes 
hanging in the balance, Dix was finally given permission to organize a military 
expedition to the Shore. The conciliatory tone of the bloodless expedition and its 
emphasis on encouraging Unionism rather than punishing disloyalty set the tone for 
Union policy that would largely cater to the interests of whites on the Shore. Dix 
provided commanding General H. H. Lockwood with a force of 3,500 men that was 
explicitly designed to "overawe the opposition." Moreover, Dix assured President 
Lincoln that the expedition would proceed by "giving [Shore whites] the strongest 
assurance of kind treatment and protection if  they do not resist the authority of the 
Government.. .1 trust—I ought to say I hope rather than I trust—that they may be 
gained over without bloodshed." Dix reminded General Lockwood that "your force is 
intended for the protection of loyal and peaceable citizens; you will see that it is not 
perverted by the misconduct of anyone under your command to their annoyance."
Dix added force to this warning by ordering Lockwood to punish any soldier who
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"might commit any outrage on the person or property of any citizen" with a stint "in 
the irons."99
Most important, in a November proclamation to Shore residents, Dix
promised that Union troops would not interfere with slavery on the Shore:
The Military Forces of the United States are about to enter your Counties as a 
part of the Union. They will go among you as friends, and with the earnest 
hope that they may not, by your own acts, be forced to become your enemies. 
They will invade no rights of person or property. On the contrary, your laws, 
your institutions, your usages will be scrupulously respected. There need be 
no fear that the quietude of any fireside will be disturbed, unless the 
disturbance is created by yourselves. Special directions have been given not 
to interfere with the condition o f any persons held to domestic service; and, in 
order that there may be no ground fo r  mistake or pretext fo r  
misrepresentation, commanders have been instructed not to permit any such 
persons to come within their lines (italics mine).100
On the surface, Lockwood’s expedition accomplished all of Dix's stated goals. 
Though the Confederate militia had anticipated the expedition's arrival by burning 
bridges and "throwing trees across roads," Union troops met no military opposition. 
Soldiers testified that many of the "rebels were dispersed to their homes," and that a 
"large body" o f the Confederate militia” had fled South.. .and were trying to escape 
over to the mainland."
Troop behavior was exemplary; soldiers invited local whites to join in the 
singing of the national anthem, and Shore whites were provided with "the most 
abundant compensation for everything that was taken, or claimed to have been taken" 
by Union soldiers. Newspaper accounts and private diaries indicate that General 
Lockwood whipped and expelled local slaves who tried to escape from their masters, 
a gesture that "had much to do with winning back the feelings of these people." One 
soldier claimed that the expedition had been successful in "restoring confidence to
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Unionists and demoralizing the secessionists," an assessment that was apparently 
validated on election day, when both Eastern Shore counties rejected secession 
ordinances and instead elected Unionist officials to local posts.101
The outcome of the Dix expedition did not bode well for Shore freedpeople. 
With local planters in abundance, military officials could bypass Village-style labor 
camps and move directly to forced contract labor as a means of eliminating public 
responsibility for the ever-growing class of freedpeople. The coercive nature of the 
system and the lack of sufficient federal oversight of contracts and labor relations 
exposed the irrelevance of radical “free labor ideology” in the real world of wartime 
Reconstruction.
Despite the 1861 election results cited above, the Dix expedition also failed to 
eradicate secessionism from the Shore. Many Confederates sympathizers simply kept 
quiet during the expedition and subsequent election, while many others returned 
periodically from mainland Virginia. Just months after the expedition, General 
Lockwood himself returned to the Shore and concluded that "the mild and kind policy 
o f General Dix, in-so-far as the building up of loyal sentiment is concerned, has 
proved a failure." Wartime and postwar violence and labor conflicts quickly exposed 
the hollow nature o f Dix's victory, a "triumph" that left freedpeople to fend for
i mthemselves amidst a community of hostile, racist whites.
When army officials returned to investigate labor relations on the Shore in 
1863, they found a chaotic situation that required some government action. Military 
investigators concluded that most Shore residents were "secesh," and warned federal
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officials in Washington that Shore whites were "feeding and helping rebel guerillas" 
and conducting illicit trade with mainland Confederate forces. One army investigator 
called for immediate reinforcements to prevent the "raids and rumors of raids from 
rebels on the other side of the [Chesapeake] Bay" and to deal "with plenty of evil
103disposed persons on the Shore."
Perhaps more pressing was the problematic relationship developing between 
Shore freedpeople and local whites. Investigators reported that most of the 
freedpeople on the Shore were "black women and children turned off by masters" 
who had either fled to the mainland. Moreover, there was no uniform labor policy for 
freedpeople who remained on local farms; investigators distinguished between 
freedpeople who were "working at wages" and "others working for their old masters 
without wages."104
Thus, by 1863 the bulwark of Unionism had become a region teetering on the 
brink of large-scale black poverty. Though the Shore remained nominally Unionist, 
occasional "raids" revealed the depth of racism and secessionism in Northampton and 
Accomac. Army officials on the Shore (including the Provost Marshal) were also 
worried about the growing population o f landless and unemployed "freed slaves 
living in idleness," a group that represented a potentially disastrous financial public 
burden. Army officials did acknowledge that "whites encouraged such disorderliness 
by refusing to employ or assist Negroes and by treating them cruelly in some 
instances."105
Throughout 1863 and early 1864, army officials devised various methods for 
restoring order to the Eastern Shore. One military official characterized the Shore as
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"a virgin field" for black soldiers, and recommended the conscription of all able- 
bodied males ages 18-45. Meanwhile, Colonel C. S. Henry ordered the construction 
of a Negro House o f Refuge for the infirm, and the military provided rations for 
"destitute Negroes and soldier's wives," though many were forced to travel over 40 
miles to receive their rations. Soldiers herded other women and elderly freedpeople 
into inadequate makeshift Houses of Refuge. One employee at a Refuge house 
complained that "I have about 50 [freedpeople] piled into a kitchen and bam .. .1 have 
nothing for them to eat and no implements for them to work with."106
This incipient federal charity program was complimented by a rudimentary 
federal labor program. Military officers stationed at the Office of the Provost 
Marshal on the Eastern Shore organized unemployed contrabands into geographic 
"districts" where they would work as farmers on abandoned land. Crucially, the land 
was not to be controlled by the federal government or the freedpeople themselves; 
rather, abandoned land was to be leased to local whites who would hire freedpeople 
on a contractual basis. Army officials added one more harbinger o f future problems 
for freedpeople: they were not allowed to leave their districts—roughly equivalent to 
Shore towns—without a government-issued passport.107
By November 1864, army officials were forced to admit that these initial 
plans had failed. A series of investigators led by new Provost Marshal Col. Frank 
White concluded that further government action was needed “in order to end the evils 
on the Shore: the idleness of Negroes and the bad or improper treatment by masters 
o f servants.” Local masters often refused to pay wages to black farmhands, a 
scenario that allegedly resulted in freedpeople “refusing to labor for a livelihood and
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subsisting in part by depredations upon the property of others.” Meanwhile, black 
women and children “were mostly destitute and greatly in need of assistance.”108
Officials devised a dual strategy to solve the Shore’s growing economic and 
racial problems. First, Provost White and his military aides essentially forced blacks 
to engage in contract-based agricultural labor. Beginning on January 1, 1865, 
soldiers at the Office of the Provost Marshal proclaimed that “all persons over 16 not 
engaged in employment will report to this office in order that work may be found for 
them. None who are able to work can be allowed to remain in idleness.” In addition, 
army officials explicitly ordered “all Negroes” (presumably over 16 years o f age) to 
find employment within thirty days, after which time “employment will be furnished 
for them.” Federal workers assured local whites that “all persons desiring to procure 
house servants or field laborers of any kind.. .will be supplied without delay.”109
To their credit, soldiers and federal bureaucrats did try to help freedpeople by 
strictly overseeing contract negotiations between freedpeople and planters. The new 
regulations outlawed the vague, easily exploited verbal contracts often favored by 
planters, and prohibited the imposition of wage ceilings for black workers.
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and planters were warned that “bad or cruel treatment shall be considered a violation 
of contract.” Despite these apparent safeguards, army officials limited the mobility of 
freedpeople by demanding that all contracts be made on a monthly, seasonal, or
tViannual basis, and by allowing “only 1/20 or 1/10 ” of the local black population to 
“hire themselves out as day laborers”— a lucrative opportunity given only to those
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freedpeople who could obtain a certificate signed by six local whites who were 
willing to characterize the individual as “trustworthy.”110
Though a well-organized and closely monitored contract labor system 
promised potential benefits for unemployed and unpaid freedpeople, the ideological 
justifications provided by military officials foreshadowed the dangers and limitations 
of such a system. One official claimed that widespread contract labor would “furnish 
to the farmers and residents of this Shore, economical and regular labor, and to the 
colored, a lawful and profitable means of subsistence.” Provost Marshal and Lt. Col. 
Frank J. White—the architect o f the contract plan—echoed these sentiments, 
trumpeting the system’s potential effectiveness in “solving the want of labor for 
[Shore] farmers” and “preventing the idleness of Negroes and the concomitant evils 
of thievery and general demoralization, evils that [contract labor] shall correct by 
forcing all Negroes to work.”111
When evaluating the system in early 1865, White displayed the cultural 
arrogance and insensitivity typical o f mid-nineteenth century white officials, 
emphasizing that “the education of slavery taught [freedpeople] to have no care for 
the future.. .The rights of property to them were a farce.” For White, the legacy of 
slavery resulted only in “idleness, dishonesty, and disease,” and the contract labor 
system was the only viable method of “social and moral elevation” for Shore 
freedpeople. Indeed, White dismissed federal philanthropy as “lacking all practical 
sense,” and rejected the alternative (used at Freedmen’s Village and other openly 
disloyal areas) of government-sponsored “contraband farms,” since such settlements 
encouraged the formation of isolated all-black communities that would inevitably
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engender “distrust” and suspicion among local whites. Finally, White argued that 
Shore freedpeople would be helpless within a commercial or industrial economy, 
since such spheres were dominated by “enterprising men of commerce” and thus
119represented “labor markets where Africans cannot compete."
These statements make it unmistakably clear that the contract labor system set 
up on the Eastern Shore was designed primarily to benefit local whites. Military 
officials were determined to avoid the expensive responsibility o f providing direct 
financial aid to Shore freedpeople, and barely considered supplying freedmen with 
local land. In their desire to reward “Unionist” Shore farmers with a stable and 
profitable labor system, federal workers merely echoed the philosophy of the earlier 
Dix expedition. Likewise, their narrow-minded and condescending characterization 
of blacks as inferior beings corrupted by slavery and best suited to dependent 
agricultural labor mirrored the educational philosophy of the American Tract Society.
Not surprisingly, the advantages theoretically offered by the contract labor 
system melted away when it was actually implemented; without the direct aid of 
federal officials who consistently avoided intervening in the “free labor” economy, 
Shore freedpeople suffered from the unfair contracts and blatant exploitation that 
would define the postbellum black experience throughout the South.
The second element of the 1864 reorganization of the Eastern Shore was a 
limited charity program. The same November 1864 proclamations issued by the 
Provost Marshal that outlined the contract labor system also accepted the notion that 
“assistance in sickness, destitution, or distress shall be given by this government.”
The military financed a series of local “asylums” for the aged and infirm, and did
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reserve small tracts of land (often adjacent to the asylums) for “government farms to 
be used only for such as from old age or physical infirmity are absolutely unable to 
support themselves.” Federal officials approved the formation of public markets that 
would sell the “necessities of life” at affordable prices, and continued to provide 
rations for “soldiers’ wives,” “destitute contrabands,” and the inmates of government 
asylums.113
Unfortunately, government charity was often insufficient and was gradually 
reduced still further. The inmates of several asylums were “in very great need of 
clothing and blankets,” and many hospital patients were eventually forced to work on 
adjacent government farms. Meanwhile, one farm superintendent regretted that he 
could “not guarantee shelter” for many o f his laborers.
As the war went on, army officials became less willing to provide charity for 
any freedpeople, regardless of age or physical condition. An edict of January 1865 
requested that the superintendents of the Shore’s most prominent government farm 
(fittingly named for John Dix) send all resident women and children to the local 
federal office to find contractual employment. A month later, Colonel Frank White 
suggested that “no issue [of rations] be made at all to the contrabands, except in such 
special cases of destitution as in any judgment may require assistance.” White then 
claimed that he could “reduce by one half the current rations if all [freedpeople] are 
required to work.” A year later, army officials finally limited rations only to “such 
[freedpeople] as are in a hospital or sick and under treatment by a surgeon.” This 
solution was supposed to ensure that all Shore freedpeople would “be made to 
provide for themselves and their families.”114
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As was the case at Freedmen’s Village, federal officials avoided widespread 
philanthropy in fear o f creating a dependent and financially burdensome black 
population. Though this fear was certainly justified, freedpeople with limited 
financial resources and experience could not be expected to succeed without 
sustained assistance from the federal government. In some respects, the system of 
contract labor used on the Shore (and elsewhere) was designed specifically to prevent 
freedpeople from having financial success. Military officials ignored other radical 
alternatives (like land ownership) and instead created a coercive system of contract 
labor under which local planters essentially “drafted” freedpeople for positions as 
- subordinate laborers—positions that many military officials saw as permanent and 
just..
Despite promises of increased government regulation, Shore whites used the 
contract labor system to exploit black laborers. When the Freedmen’s Bureau 
assumed control of Shore labor relations in the spring of 1865, Bureau investigator 
Stuart Barnes criticized the state of contractual labor relations on the Shore. Barnes 
said that he would
report favorably on [the contract system] and call it beneficial to the Negro and 
his employer if  properly managed, but I must say that in very many instances the 
power of the Assistant Superintendent of Labor has been very badly abused and 
hundreds of Negroes are hired out for merely a pittance, much less than they 
could earn, as day laborers, and much less than the employers acknowledge they 
are worth.
Bames also found evidence that army had long been embezzling funds intended for 
asylums and hospitals, though he admitted that in at least a few asylums “the sick are 
well-cared for and the accommodations are ample.” Bames did, however, find other 
hospitals where “enfeebled Negroes” lived in “exceedingly poor accommodations.”
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White himself conceded that agricultural “employees had not been paid in many 
instances for seven months, although many o f them were poor Negroes whose 
families were starving while they were working.”115
Available labor contracts from 1864 and 1865 validate Barnes’s pessimistic 
conclusions. Though White and his military comrades had expected freedpeople to 
earn approximately $100 per year, available contracts indicate that most earned well 
under half that sum (some even less than $30 for an entire year!), while many others 
(especially women) were paid nothing after agreeing to contracts that provided only 
“food, shelter, and clothing” in exchange for labor. Contracts were invariably made 
for the duration of one year and usually stipulated that time missed due to sickness or 
physical injury resulted in non-payment o f wages. Planters regularly withheld one 
month’s wages until the final settlement of the contract—an event that planters could 
intentionally avoid by dismissing freedpeople prior to the termination of the contract 
or behaving so abusively that workers simply left voluntarily, allowing the employer 
to simply pocket the final month’s wages.116
Predictably, outraged Shore freedpeople expressed concerns over the 
emerging system. In early 1865, ffeedman B. L. Parish, writing “at the most earnest 
request o f all the free men o f color o f this place,” angrily chastised the federal 
government for “employing none but the most rabid secessionists” to oversee labor 
relations on the Eastern Shore. Parish criticized the government for “hiring out by 
force all the free colored people of this District, including all who were bom free.”
He claimed that planter reluctance to hire entire families resulted in “parents being 
forced to hire out sons and daughters,” and asserted that Shore freedpeople were now
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“in worse bondage than slaves ever were.” Other documents indicate that army 
officials did in fact undermine the black family structure by encouraging planters to 
hire only those individual freedpeople who could provide immediate agricultural or
117domestic labor.
Freedpeople who could afford to rent land and thus achieve some semblance 
o f independence found this alternative closed off by Shore planters. Bureau 
investigators found that whites “refuse to rent on such terms and in some cases have 
offered exorbitant rents to be paid in cash,” an unreasonable demand that forced 
freedpeople “to hire out their labor to the best employer.” Thus, the contract labor 
program implemented on the Shore (like Nathaniel Banks’s labor system in 
Louisiana) foreshadowed the tragic economic marginalization of Southern blacks that 
would define the Reconstruction years. Federal officials were unwilling to alienate a 
population of “loyal” whites by confiscating abandoned land or actively monitoring 
Shore labor relations to ensure that freedmen were treated equitably. The results were 
predictable; Shore planters used to contract system to closely replicate antebellum 
slavery and forced freedpeople into positions of economic dependence by refusing to 
rent or sell land at fair prices. In fact, the writings and rationalizations of some 
government officials suggest that many of them envisioned an economy in which 
freedpeople were permanent agricultural laborers—hardly a philosophy that could or 
should be labeled “free labor ideology.”118
Despite the initial admonitions of Freedmen’s Bureau officials, available 
evidence suggests that Bureau representatives on the Shore simply continued the 
labor policies of their wartime predecessors. Though Bureau officials promised to
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“watch closely all the contracts that are made” and “annul those which are unjust,” 
they reminded freedpeople that the Bureau “has but an advisory role relative to 
contracts” and reiterated their primary desire “to urge the freedmen to have a 
definitive agreement with employers or landlords.” Bureau representatives admitted 
that several cases “have been brought before [Bureau courts] principally on account 
of non-payment o f wages,” but assured freedpeople in March 1866 that such 
injustices would be easily rectified in Bureau courts. Unfortunately, the Bureau 
closed all of its Shore courts in May 1866, declaring that “all cases, civil and 
criminal, in this district will hereafter be tried by state courts”—thus guaranteeing 
that pl anters would continue to exploit black employees without fear of legal 
consequences. As briefly noted above, the Bureau also continued wartime reductions 
in the level of government philanthropy and rations provided to Shore freedpeople.119
By mid-1866, a local Bureau official blindly affirmed that Shore freedpeople 
lived “in excellent conditions,” a claim that was apparently based on the fact that “all 
who are able to work are in some lucrative employment.” Contemporary evidence 
suggests otherwise, and the same Bureau official conceded that “many former slave- 
masters will hire no black man on his farms, nor will they rent them one foot of 
ground to cultivate.” Perhaps most telling, the same bureaucrat happily recorded that 
the “feeling of whites here toward the Bureau is friendly, the whites believing its 
object to be justice.”120
Meanwhile, as they did at Arlington and elsewhere, Shore freedpeople 
actively resisted government policy and planter exploitation, and, in doing so, 
articulated their own version of freedom. Like their counterparts at Arlington, Shore
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freedpeople sought financial independence and stability through land ownership. 
Surprised Bureau officials “discovered several places on abandoned land where 
Negroes have built houses and are cultivating a few areas of land.” Bureau agents 
either disbanded such settlements or forced their residents to lease or rent the land
i j  I
directly from the federal government.
When land ownership was impossible, freedpeople with some means usually 
sought to rent or lease land from local whites or federal officials. Though most Shore 
planters feared even this degree of black independence, some freedpeople were able 
to obtain land by these methods. One local Bureau agent informed his superior in 
Washington that “many colored persons to whom abandoned land has, been leased are 
exceedingly anxious to ascertain whether the same will be available for the ensuing 
year, in order that they might make arrangements in preparing their fields for another 
crop.” Thus, black lessees tried to stake a permanent or at least long-term claim to
1 ' j ' j
abandoned Shore land.
Other freedpeople simply refused to participate in the contract labor system.
In early 1865, Col. Frank White complained bitterly about freedman Griffin Collins,
“a leader of that small class of colored persons who have since their emancipation, 
refused to labor for a livelihood, and who have maintained themselves principally by 
theft.” Collins and the rest of these allegedly unruly freedmen “stirred up publicly as 
much opposition as possible among the colored people, advising them to refuse to 
obey!” Perhaps most revealingly, Collins himself was able to rent a sizable farm on 
which he “employed only freedmen who refused to obey [government] orders.” By 
renting land and employing other angry freedmen, Collins and his friends
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successfully avoided the financial dependence and exploitation that were endemic to
1the Shore’s contract labor system.
By late 1866, freedpeople who could not afford to rent or lease land found 
another alternative to the federally imposed contract labor system. In January 1867, 
Bureau officials and local planters complained that “many o f the freedmen declined 
entry into new employments for the present year.” Bureau workers learned that 
freedpeople “preferred instead to rent small pieces and tracts of land and cultivate 
them for part of the crop therein, rather than hire themselves out. They have the 
erroneous idea that if  they hire themselves out, they are no longer their own masters.” 
As many scholars have argued, sharecropping thus seems to have emerged as part of 
a compromise between freedpeople who wanted some degree of control over the 
labor process (to be “their own masters”) and local planters who needed steady labor 
but could not or would not rent or lease their land to freedmen on a cash basis. The 
system initially offered freedpeople a degree of independence and control that was 
unattainable within the Shore’s contract labor system.124
Some Shore freedpeople also acquired or already possessed lucrative artisanal 
skills that they could use to steer clear of contract labor. While artisans at 
Freedmen’s Village were not permitted to sell their products on the open market, 
army officials on the Shore proclaimed in January 1865 that “skilled artisans will be 
permitted to work at such times and places as they may.” Officials noted the 
proliferation of “blacksmiths, carpenters, and shoemakers,” and remarked that “many 
[freedpeople] take up oystering” during appropriate seasons.125
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Like freedpeople throughout the South, Shore freedpeople also achieved social 
stability by building strong community institutions. Local blacks turned abandoned 
or seldom-used churches into active places of worship, and constructed well-attended 
schools throughout the Shore. One local Bureau official informed Bureau 
headquarters that “the school referred to is entirely the enterprise of the Negroes.
They hired Miss Margaret Strong to teach them, a lady eminently qualified for the 
position.” He concluded his letter by reiterating that he “had nothing to do with the 
establishment of this school and will not interfere in this matter.”
Elsewhere along the Shore, officials admired a “new school built by blacks” 
and organized by a local (black) minister who promised that freedpeople would 
“graciously supply all the labor” necessary for a functional school. By all accounts, 
attendance at black schools was “very large,” and students of all ages exhibited “a 
great desire and ability to learn.” Freedpeople in Accomac petitioned the Freedmen’s 
Bureau, requesting the necessary funds to hire two teachers. In their petition, they 
reminded the Bureau that “we have after two years hard labor succeeded in building
1 OAtwo small churches which are to be used as schoolhouses every day.”
By renting land, sharecropping,-working as artisans, and building strong 
community institutions, Shore freedpeople were effectively creating their own 
alternative vision of freedom. While some government officials and local planters 
envisioned an agricultural economy with freedmen permanently relegated to positions 
as dependent laborers, Shore freedmen sought financial independence and land 
ownership that would ultimately lead to upward mobility.
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These efforts combined to produce an intense wave of post-war racial 
violence on the Eastern Shore, a well-organized reign of terror that was able to thrive 
within a climate of federal non-intervention. Instances o f racially motivated violence 
did occur sporadically throughout the war itself; government officials worried about 
"raids and rumors of raids" from Shore rebels, and local whites burned down a few 
black schools and churches. In the spring and summer of 1866, however, small-scale 
localized violence gave way to widespread terror.127
The change began in June of 1866, when freedman Charles Cranch allegedly 
tried to kill a local white storekeeper, one Mr. Bird. According to available records, 
Cranch attempted to rob Bird's store. When spied by the storekeeper, Cranch 
responded by "cutting [Bird's] throat" and quickly escaped before eventually being 
caught and hanged by vigilantes. Over the next six months, incensed local whites 
began a series of "indiscriminate attacks upon freedmen." A group estimated as 
numbering over 300 men formed "Simon Brown's Company," a band of ex- 
Confederates and wartime blockade-runners who utilized Klan-style methods of 
violence to terrorize local blacks. One Freedmen’s Bureau official described the
l y p i C a i  k t i iciCK In  v iv iu  u c ia .ii.
[Simon Brown's Company] went to all colored people's houses and finding 
firearms and ammunition in them, they took all they could find, and then 
organizing themselves into squads, they went to colored people's homes and 
demanded admittance, saying they wanted Cranch and if  the doors were not 
thrown open, they would crush them in, which they did in many cases. After 
getting into the houses they would commence looking for firearms and 
money, or whatever valuables they could get hold of.128
The attacks were consistently described as "unprovoked" and were often
horrific. Official records and available trial transcripts mention several fatal
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shootings, and one claims that Brown's Company sometimes forced freedpeople to 
vacate the Shore entirely. Those who were bold enough to resist such orders were 
most commonly "shot and cruelly beaten." A similar pattern was repeated 
consistently: angry whites, often with "their faces blacked" and sometimes going 
about "in daylight without any disguise," entered the homes of freedpeople and stole 
firearms, valuables, "hairbrushes and combs," and any other available symbols of 
black economic gain. One Bureau argued that the entire wave of violence was caused 
by "the presence of many colored soldiers who upon being mustered out of service 
retained their arm s.. .Almost every freedman has an old gun or pistol he relies on for 
protection or hunting.. .[The Company] is focused on disarming returned colored 
soldiers." Another Bureau investigator claimed that Brown's Company v/as 
disproportionately comprised of "a class of poor whites whose hatred arises from the 
fear that some freedmen will outstrip them in bettering their conditions. They believe
129that the nigger has not even the right to live."
This pattern of postwar violence on the Shore resembled the racial attacks that 
plagued other Southern states during the same years. Several scholars have noted the 
tendency among whites to attack symbols of black progress and domestic stability. 
Whites destroyed community institutions and emasculated black patriarchs by 
invading their private sphere (the home) and removing all representations of black
1 "J A
strength (firearms) and economic progress (valuables and the houses themselves).
Federal authorities rarely intervened to quash racial violence on the Shore.
The same federal officials who haphazardly funneled freedpeople into private 
contract labor relied exclusively on ineffective local courts to curtail white violence.
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Officials initially sent federal troops from Fort Monroe to quell the disturbances 
during the summer of 1866. The troops actually arrested four members o f Brown's 
Company linked directly to the hanging of Charles Cranch, but allowed local courts 
to handle the case despite repeated warnings that "if [the suspects] are tried in a civil 
court, they will not be convicted. . .It would be impossible to get a jury to convict a 
white man on the evidence of a colored man." The trial proved to be a farce.
Members of Brown's Company threatened to "kill the first black man" who provided 
evidence "on the spot," while the all-white jury refused to allow local blacks to testify 
and prohibited the use of "colored evidence" entirely. All of the accused were
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quickly acquitted, despite the fact that "their names and deeds are widely known."
Throughout 1866 and 1867, federal officials allowed fearful and/or racist local 
authorities to deal with race-related crimes on the Shore. According to one angry 
Bureau investigator, the seemingly ceaseless attacks on local freedpeople were "in 
part due to the meekness and incapacity of local officials who are weak vacillating 
men possessing no moral courage and who are totally unable to preserve the peace or 
awe the violators." Various interviews with local justices of the peace validate this 
rather harsh condemnation of local authorities. Justice George Pew "was intimidated" 
by local vigilantes and refused to issue arrest warrants because his "neighbors were 
aroused and excited" by the anti-black fervor that swept the Shore. Likewise, Justice 
o f the Peace William Dix advised a local officer hostile to Brown's Company that "he 
better leave the matter alone or his life might be taken," while Dix admitted that his 
own silence and inaction were due to his fear o f "getting into trouble" with local 
whites. Bureau investigators sympathetic with the freedpeople’s cause angrily
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reported that "local justices refuse to issue warrants in fear of their own safety," and 
another anti-Brown official stationed on the Shore was so afraid o f violent reprisals 
that he wanted his name removed from all government documents related to Shore
132violence.
Once again, the admirable exposes and angry reports of a few isolated Bureau 
officers could not overcome the overall conservatism of the Bureau and the federal 
government as a whole. Bureau officials on the Shore and their counterparts in 
Washington continued to rely on local courts, even though it was obvious that the 
muscle o f the Shore legal system was arrayed against freedpeople. Justice of the 
Peace George Pew claimed that "all the constables in the county are strong 
sympathizers with the rioters," while Bureau investigators again and again 
complained that local constables and sheriffs "do not seek knowledge of the crimes 
committed but rather avoid such information and would rather let the offenders go 
untouched by justice." Indeed, some evidence indicates that Brown's Company 
essentially became the law; white citizens including shopkeeper Bird offered 
members o f Brown's Company financial rewards in exchange for the capture and 
lynching of local freedpeople. At the very least, local constables "remained silent" 
and "avoided trying to prevent" violence against freedpeople. The attacks on blacks 
abated only in the latter part of 1867.133
Scholars should be careful, though, in conflating government inaction in the 
face o f violence with the federal policy o f favoring contract labor. While federal 
officials openly expressed a desire to leave freedpeople to fend for themselves within 
the competitive (and racist) labor market, the same bureaucrats seldom argued
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(directly and openly, at least) that violence against Shore freedpeople was a 
temporary problem with an automatic, local solution. In other words, while some 
federal officials openly and maliciously encouraged the economic marginalization of 
Shore freedpeople, their reactions to racial violence were simultaneously non­
interventionist and sympathetic. Despite this important distinction, the reluctance of 
federal officials who opposed federal intervention on principal alone or who feared 
alienating a nominally "loyal" population, led to financial and personal disaster for 
many Shore freedpeople.
Many scholars have used the concept of “free labor ideology” to explain the 
failure of Reconstruction in the South. That mid-nineteenth century Republican ideal 
can be roughly defined as the belief that a “free labor economy” was more efficient 
and productive than a slave-based economy. “Free labor” Republicans also believed 
that freedpeople—if  given a free and fair chance to compete in the capitalist 
economy—would ultimately succeed, since a true free labor economy rewarded hard 
work above all else.
Since the early 1980s, historians (most notably Eric Foner) have found fault 
with this ideology. They have argued quite convincingly that many “free labor” 
Republicans held an unrealistic faith in the free market, one that led them to favor a 
limited and temporary federal role in the Reconstruction of the South. Once slavery 
was destroyed, these pundits claimed, the federal government could leave freedpeople 
to fend for themselves in the new competitive economy. Widespread charity, land 
redistribution, or other costly plans were therefore unnecessary.
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While this argument remains a persuasive way to explain the rise of Liberal 
Republicanism and the general Republican (and Northern) reluctance to aid Southern 
freedpeople in the early 1870s, it cannot alone account for the shortcomings of 
military and Bureau policy on the ground level during the war and the early postwar 
years. In both Freedmen’s Village and Virginia’s Eastern Shore, military and (later) 
Bureau officials never came close to applying a true free labor philosophy. Though 
isolated voices of protest emerged within the government (especially the Bureau), 
federal policy exploited freedpeople during the war and forced freedpeople into slave­
like positions as dependent agricultural laborers after the war.
Indeed, the overriding goal o f federal policy was to eliminate the potential 
public “burden” the freedpeople represented and stabilize the postwar Southern 
economy by placing freedpeople in the inferior positions where they “belonged” in 
the eyes of many officials. Contract labor under private planters represented the most 
efficient way to accomplish these goals, and the military and the Bureau both chose 
this solution whenever it was possible in both Arlington and the Eastern Shore.
Though contract labor paid wages and technically placed freedpeople within 
the larger competitive economy, it was in no way “free labor”; military and Bureau 
officials simply forced freedpeople to sign contracts, giving them little or no role in 
choosing the terms of their economic future. Other options—industrial labor, 
artisanal work, migration to the North, and (most radical of all) land redistribution— 
were eliminated by the federal emphasis on contract labor. Most damning of all, 
many military and Bureau officials openly justified this policy with racist rhetoric 
about the “rightful place” of freedpeople as subordinate farm workers. Radical talk
about a potential “revolution in race relations” was meaningless when the military 
and Bureau officials on the local level—the men who really made federal policy— 
were determined to prevent that revolution from happening.
Finally, when factors like the lack of an accessible local planter class in 
Arlington made contract labor impossible, the federal military simply decided to 
temporarily exploit contrabands for its own purposes. Until overcrowding 
necessitated a change in Village policy, military officials at Freedman’s Village 
impressed able contrabands and transformed the remaining freedpeople into a mass of 
underpaid (indeed, virtually unpaid) government workers with no mobility and no 
control over Village land or the products of their labor. Though the grounds of 
Arlington looked green and scenic in comparison to the crowded streets of nearby 
Washington, the Village remained (in essence) a forced labor camp.
In short, historians can find the roots of Reconstruction’s failure in the 
wartime and immediate postwar government policies in Arlington and Virginia’s 
Eastern Shore. The freedpeople— despite their efforts and demands for 
independence— could not overcome the racism of local planters and the conservatism 
of the federal officials who would play a crucial role in determining their immediate 
economic future. When one considers wartime and early Reconstruction, it becomes 
readily understandable that many freedpeople across the South ultimately concluded 
that “The Yankees helped free us, so they say, but they let us be put back in slavery
69
NOTES
1 George Payne addressing a group o f  his fellow freedmen. Cited in James McPherson, The 
Negro's Civil War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965), p. 62.
2 Annie Davis to President Lincoln, cited in Ira Berlin, Barbara J. Fields, Travolia Glymph, 
Joseph P. Reidy, and Leslie Rowland, Eds. Freedom: A Documentary History o f  Emancipation, 1861- 
1867: Series I, Volume I: The Destruction o f  Slavery (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1985), p. 384.
3 For good examples o f revisionist and post-revisionist Reconstruction literature, see Laura 
Edwards, Gendered Strife and Confusion: The Political Culture o f  Reconstruction (Chicago: 
University o f Illinois Press, 1997); Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution 
(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988); and Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise o f  Principle 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1974).
4See Louis Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward Southern 
Blacks,1861-1865 (London: Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 7 and p. 167.
5For several treatments o f Southern contraband policy and Louisiana Reconstruction see 
Lawanda Cox, Lincoln and Black Freedom  (Columbia, S. C.: University o f  South Carolina Press,
1981); Peyton McCrary, Abraham Lincoln and Reconstruction: The Louisiana Experiment (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978); C. Peter Ripley, Slaves and Freedmen in Civil War 
Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976); Jacque Voegeli, Free but Not 
Equal: The M idwest and the Negro During the Civil War (Chicago, University o f Chicago Press, 
1967); Martha Bigelow, "Vicksburg: Experiment in Freedom," Journal o f  Mississippi History, 
Volume 26 (1), 1964, pp. 28-44; Martha Bigelow, "Freedmen o f the Mississippi Valley, 1862-1865," 
Civil War History, Volume 8 (1), (1962), pp. 38-47; Martha Bigelow, "Plantation Lessee Problems in 
1864," The Journal o f  Southern History, Volume 27 (3), (1961), pp. 354-367; Joseph Holliday, 
"Freedmen's Aid Societies in Cincinnati, 1862-1870," Cincinnati Historical Society Bulletin, Volume 
22 (3), (1964), pp. 169-185; Frank Levstik, "A Journey Among the Contrabands," Indiana Magazine 
o f  History, Volume 73 (3), (1977), pp. 203-222; William Messner, "Black Violence and White 
Response: Louisiana, 1862," The Journal o f  Southern History. Volume 41 (1), (1975), pp. 19-38; and 
C. Peter Ripley, "The Black Family in Transition: Louisiana, 1860-1865," The Journal o f  Southern 
History, Volume 41 (3), (1975), pp. 369-380;
6 Cam Walker, "Corinth: The Story o f a Contraband Camp," Civil War History,
Volume 20 (1), (1974), 5-22, p. 17. Walker's article makes for a very interesting comparison with 
Freedmen's Village. Like the Village, Corinth seems to have been a preferable alternative to 
dangerously crowded camps and contract labor, but officials at Corinth also never embraced free labor 
ideology.
7 For information on Davis Bend, see Janet Lee Hermann, Pursuit o f  a Dream  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1981); James T. Currie, "Freedmen at Davis Bend, April 1864," Journal o f  
M ississippi History, Volume 46 (2), (1984), pp. 120-129; Steven J. Ross, "Freed Soil, Freed Labor, 
Freed Men: John Eaton and the Davis Bend Experiment," The Journal o f  Southern History, Volume 
44 (2), (1978), pp. 213-232. Davis Bend contrasts sharply with Freedmen's Village, since a select
70
[Notes to pages 4-7]
group o f freedmen at the Bend were able to independently cultivate the land without government 
interference.
8 See Willie Lee Rose, Rehearsal fo r  Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment (New  
York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1964). While nearly all Sea Island lands were eventually taken 
from freedmen and redistributed to white entrepreneurs, wartime Reconstruction at Port Royal 
generally allowed freedmen to operate under a much greater degree o f independence than their 
counterparts at Arlington. In addition, see James McPherson, The Struggle fo r  Equality (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), which generally argues that abolitionists and 
missionaries combined to make wartime Reconstruction a radical departure from slavery.
Interestingly, after reviewing Gerteis' From Contraband to Freedman, McPherson confesses that he 
was probably far too "optimistic" in his assessment o f contraband camps and wartime Reconstruction 
and regrets lending almost all historical agency to abolitionists and missionaries rather than the blacks 
themselves.
9 For other general "pessimistic" interpretations o f contraband policy that mirror Gerteis' 
work, see Leon Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), which has 
brief sections on contraband camps within a more "optimistic" narrative; Mary Berry, Military 
Necessity and Civil Rights Policy (London: National University Publications, 1977), which argues 
convincingly that policy toward contrabands was largely determined by military demands rather than 
any ethical sympathy with the contrabands themselves; Susie Ames, "Federal Policy Toward the 
Eastern Shore o f Virginia in 1861," Virginia Magazine o f  History and Biography, Volume 69 (4), 
(1961), pp. 432-459; Gaines Foster, "The Limitations o f Federal Health Care for Freedmen, 1862- 
1870," The Journal o f  Southern History. Volume 48 (3), (19??), pp. 349-372; and Louis Gerteis, 
"Salmon P. Chase, Radicalism, and the Politics o f Emancipation," The Journal o f  American History, 
Volume 60 (1), (1973), pp. 42-62.
10 For the scant historiography on Freedmen's Village, see Roberta Schildt, "Aladdin's Lamp: 
Education in Freedmen's Village," Arlington Historical Magazine, Volume 10 (3),(1995), pp. 7-18; 
Roberta Schildt, "Freedman's Village: Arlington, Virginia, 1863-1900," Arlington Historical 
Magazine', Joseph Reidy, "Coming From the Shadow of the Past: The Transition from Slavery to 
Freedom and Freedmen's Village, 1863-1900," The Virginia Magazine o f  History and Biography, 
Volume 95 (4), (1987), pp. 403-428; Felix James, "The Establishment o f Freedmen's Village in 
Arlington, Virginia," Negro History Bulletin, Volume 33 (4), (1970), pp. 90-93; Felix James, "The 
Decline and Fall o f Freedmen's Village," Negro History Bulletin, Volume 37 (3), (1974), pp. 247-250. 
Schildt's work is mostly descriptive and lacks argumentation, while James focuses mostly on the 
establishment and late nineteenth century decline o f the Village. Reidy's article is excellent, but is 
basically concerned with the administration o f the Freedmen's Bureau and gives little attention to 
wartime Reconstruction.
11 For interesting takes on these issues, see James Scott, Seeing Like the State How Certain 
Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); 
see also Foner, Reconstruction. Foner's work is a must for anyone seeking to understand what he has 
deemed "free labor ideology," while Scott's comparative analysis o f various state-sponsored camps and 
"reorganizations" seems particularly relevant to Freedmen's Village. Scott argues that government's 
often use "camps" and "settlements" to reassert control over segments o f the population that could 
prove costly or disruptive.
12 For an extensive look at private contracts and the general economic effects o f emancipation, 
see Richard Sutch and Roger Ransom, One Kind o f  Freedom: the Economic Consequences o f  
Emancipation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Also, see Dan Carter, When the War 
Was Over: The Failure o f  Self-Reconstruction in the South (London: Louisiana University Press,
71
[Notes to pages 7-12]
1985). Carter provides a Southern-based look at the white racism and intransigence that doomed 
contract labor systems and Reconstruction in general throughout the South. See also Foner, 
Reconstruction _ and William Gillette, Retreat from Reconstruction, 1869-1879 (London: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1979). Both works provide a nice overview o f the decline in the 
Republican/federal commitment to Southern blacks and the conservative nature o f "free labor 
ideology." See Scott, Seeing Like the State for an interesting comparative analysis.
13 See the following: Edwards, Gendered Strife and Confusion; Edward Magdol, A Right to 
the Land: Essays on the Freedmen's Community (London: Greenwood Press, 1977); and Julie Saville, 
The Work o f  Reconstruction: From Slave to Wage Laborer in South Carolina (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994). Each o f these works argues (to varying extents) that freedmen 
envisioned a different type o f economy, one based on land ownership and community. Saville's work 
is particularly convincing in this respect. Again, for a general economic analysis o f  the postbellum 
Southern economy, see Ransom and Sutch, One Kind o f  Freedom.
14 See Ames, "Policy on the Eastern Shore"; Carter, When the War Was Over; Ransom and 
Sutch, One Kind o f  Freedom; Saville, The Work o f  Reconstruction, and Foner, Reconstruction for 
general discussions o f contract labor policy and "free labor" economics. See also Scott, Seeing Like 
the State.
15 For recent scholarship on racial violence in the postbellum South, see especially Scott 
Nelson, Iron Confederacies: Southern Railways, Klan Violence, and Reconstruction (London: 
University o f North Carolina Press, 1999); Edwards, Gendered Strife and Confusion; and Rene 
Hayden, "An Incident o f Outrage: Gender, Race, Modernity, and the First Klan in North Carolina." 
Unpublished article written for the 2002 OAH Annual Meeting, Washington, D. C.
16Cited in Ira Berlin, Steven Miller, Joseph Reidy, and Leslie Rowland, eds, Freedom: A 
Documentary History o f  Emancipation, 1861-1867: Series I, Volume II: The Wartime Genesis o f  Free 
Labor: The Upper South (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 298.
17 See George Noyes, The Bivouac and the Battlefield (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1864), pp. 20-25.
18 For accounts o f slave escapes, see Noyes, pp. 20-25; James McPherson, The Negro's Civil 
War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965); Warren Cudsworth, History o f  the First Regiment, 
Massachusetts Infantry (Boston: Walker, Fuller, and Company, 1866), pp. 91-3; Charles Coffin,
Four Years o f  Fighting, A Volume o f  Personal Observations with the Army and Navy, from the First 
Battle o f  Bull Run to the Fall o f  Richmond (Boston: Tickner and Fields, 1866); William Howard 
Russell, My Diary North and South (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), p. 246 and p. 278; Clarence 
Mohr, On the Threshold o f  Freedom: Masters and Slaves in Civil War Georgia (London: University 
o f Georgia Press, 1986); Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1953), and Berlin, et al., The Destruction o f  Slavery^
19 W. S. Rosecrans to commander at Camp Todd, September 11, 1861, cited in R. N. Scott, et 
al, eds, War o f  the Rebellion: A Compilation o f  the Official Records o f  the Union and Confederate 
Armies (Washington, D. C., 1880-1901). For similar entries, see George Meade to Ulysses S. Grant, 
December 21, 1864 and George Morgan to Edwin Stanton May 3, 1862. The Official Records (OR) 
overflow with similar entries.
20 Colonel Henry Briggs to Brig. Gen. D. N. Couch, October 1 1861, Records o f the United 
States Continental Commands, RG 393, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
21 Charles Calvert to Simon Cameron, Records o f the Secretary o f War, RG 107, National
72
[Notes to pages 12-15]
Archives, Washington D.C; and Calvert to Stanton March 31 1862, RG 107.
22 Maryland Governor Thomas Hicks to Simon Cameron, November 18 1861, RG 107, cited 
in Berlin et al, Destruction o f  Slavery.
23 See J. H. Bayne et al to E. M. Stanton, enclosing an affidavit o f  A. J. Smoot March 1 1862, 
RG 107, cited in Berlin et al, The Destruction o f  Slavery. For other documents touching on this 
subject, see Berlin et al, The Destruction o f  Slavery, pp. 342-6 and pp. 348-65.
24 Brig. Gen. Henry H. Lockwood to Gen. Robert Schenck April 1 1863, RG 393, NA.
25 Letter forwarded by Maryland Governor Thomas Hicks to Hon. S. Cameron, November 18 
1861, RG 107, NA.
26 Affidavit o f Grandison Briscoe, February 6 1864, RG 107, NA.
27 See for instance Dola Ann Jones to Col. John Eaton August 16 1865, Records o f the 
Bureau o f Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, RG 105, NA; E. B Tyler to Lieut. Col. S. B. Lawrence 
June 15 1864, cited in Berlin, et al, The Destruction o f  Slavery, pp. 380-1; and Col. A. L. Brown to 
unnamed Captain, June 4 1864, Records o f the Adjutant General's Office, RG 94, National Archives, 
cited in Berlin, et al, The Destruction o f  Slavery, p. 382. For more documents regarding the 
controversy surrounding escaped Maryland slaves, see Berlin et al, Destruction o f  Slavery, pp. 331-
391.
f (
28 See for instance Cudsworth, p. 91 and Noyes, p. 93.
29 See Washington Evening Star, February 13, 1862 and April 4, 1862; Daily National 
Intelligencer June 25, 1861 and July 2, 1861; Margaret Leech, R evillein Washington, 1861-1865 
(New York: Time Incorporated, 1941), pp. 280-310; and Constance Greene, The Secret City: A 
History o f  Race Relations in the Nation's Capital (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), 
pp. 51-62.
30 For some vivid descriptions o f Duff Green's Row and the outdoor Washington camps, the 
spread o f disease, and the prevalence o f  "negro-stealing," see Washington Evening Star, April 23,
1861, June 25, 1861, December 5, 1861, December 4, 1861, January 6, 1862, February 13, 1862, 
March 17, 1862, April 4, 1862, May 30, 1862, and October 24, 1862; Testimony o f  Danforth B. 
Nichols before the American Freedmen's Inquire Commission April 1863, RG 94, NA; Leech, pp. 304- 
8; Green, pp. 57-62.
31 B. B. French to E. Stanton February 13 1862, RG 107, NA.
32 J. A. Dahlgren to Gideon Welles January 21 1861, Naval Records Collection o f the Office 
o f the Naval Records Library, Record Group 45, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
33 See above articles.
34 See testimony cited above in note 30.
35 Reverend Henry Taylor, cited in McPherson, Negro's Civil War, pp. 133-4.
36 Joseph Enoch Williams et al to Honorable Senate and House o f  Representatives, cited in 
Berlin et al, The Wartime Genesis o f  Free Labor, pp. 263-5.
73
[Notes to pages 15-21]
37See A Circular to the Friends o f Humanity, published by the National Freedmen's Relief 
Association, 1863.
38 See Elias Greene to Maj. Gen. S. P. Heintzelman, May 5 1863, Quartermaster General's 
Records, Records Group 92, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
39 See Harper's Weekly, May 7, 1864; Washington Evening Star, December 4, 1863 and May 
22, 1863, Daily National Intelligencer, October 7, 1863 and October 17, 1863 for idealistic 
descriptions o f the Village.
40 See Montgomery Meigs to Edwin Stanton August 15 1864, RG 92, NA; Greene to Col. 
Charles Thomas January 22 1864, RG 92, NA.
41 See above letters and newspaper articles for basic descriptions o f the Village as well as 
Charles Thomas to Elias Greene, December 5 1863, RG 92, NA for information on hospitals; J. M. 
Brown to George B. Carse March 9 1865, Records o f the Bureau o f Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, 
Record Group 105, National Archives, Washington, D. C. for a brief bit on schooling at Arlington.
42 See various issues o f The National Freedmen and the The Freedmen's Advocate from 1864- 
1865 and A Circular to the Friends o f  Humanity, published in 1866, a document that outlines the 
history and goals o f the NFRA.
43 E. H. Ludington to Col. James Hardie, March 1864, Records o f the Office o f the Inspector 
General, Record Group 159, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
44 For detailed descriptions o f Camp Barker and other struggling Washington settlements, see 
Second Annual Report o f the NFRA, cited in RG 92, NA; Josephine Griffing to M. Meigs July 22 
1865, J. M Brown to H. A. Perry February 4 1865, Brown to Meigs March 12 1865, Griffing to 
Charles Thomas January 1 1865, all found in RG 92, NA; Testimony of James J. Ferree,
Superintendent o f  Camp Barker, January 1864, RG 393, NA. For population statistics from Camp 
Barker and Freedman’s Village, see Testimony o f  Danforth B. Nichols, Superintendent o f Contrabands 
at Camp Barker (and later Freedman’s Village), April 1863, RG 105, NA.
45 For evidence o f a military presence in Arlington, see for instance General U. S. Grant to 
George Meade, May 111 865, and general orders from Headquarters o f the Army o f the Potomac, June 
25 1863, both cited in R. N. Scott's compendium o f Official Records. There are many other nearly 
identical letters detailing the constant movement o f  troops in and around Arlington. For descriptions 
of Louisiana, the Midwest, and Virginia's Eastern Shore, see appropriate books and articles by Susie 
Ames, Lawanda Cox, C. Peter Ripley, V. Jacque Voegeli, Louis Gerteis, John Eaton, Peyton McCrary, 
Mary F. Berry, Martha Bigelow, all cited above. Each of these locations featured a very large nearby 
class o f local planters, which led to the development o f (often) harsh and oppressive contract labor 
systems, most famously in Louisiana under General Nathaniel Banks. Since Arlington and many 
surrounding towns were largely abandoned once the war began, Village contrabands (partially) 
escaped this fate.
46 See E. H. Ludington and C. E. Compton to James A. Hardie, July 30 1864, RG 159, NA. 
Ludington and Compton investigated the camp in July. This seven-page letter represents their 
findings. See also Benjamin F. Taylor, Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain, With Pictures o f  Life in 
Camp and Field. (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1872), pp. 68-70. Taylor briefly visited 
the Village and saw the contrabands digging the graves o f Arlington cemetery throughout his visit.
47 For details on impressment at Freedmen's Village, see Testimony of Lieut. Charles Shepard 
January 1864, RG 393 and testimony o f Danforth B. Nichols, January 1864, RG 393, NA.
74
[Notes to pages 21-28]
48 See J. M. Brown to Mr. G. G. Beisley, December 10 1864, RG 105, NA.
49 Testimony o f Lewis Johnson, January 1864, RG 393, NA.
50 For evidence o f  forced labor among women and children see above testimony and M. 
Meigs to E. Stanton August 15 1864, RG 92, NA. For mobility regulations, see K. Knox to J. Hardie 
October 19 1864, RG 159, NA. Interestingly, freedmen were also prohibited from buying alcohol 
from a "sutler's establishment" on the premises. See J. M. Brown to George Carse November 4 1864, 
RG 105, NA.
51 Testimony o f Betsy Brown, January 1864, RG 393, NA. Also cited in Reidy, "Freedmen's 
Village," p. 413.
52 J. M. Brown to George Carse, December 3 1864, RG 105, NA.
53 For information on the Lucy Johnson case, see testimony o f  Louisa Barker, January 14 
1864, RG 393, NA.
54 For further information on the Henry Cook case, see testimony o f Henry Cook and 
Danforth Nichols, January 1864, RG 393, NA.
55 See Lewis Johnson testimony, cited in noted 49.
56 For several vivid descriptions o f the Camp Barker removal and that o f other Washington 
settlements, see D. B. Nichols to E. Greene, January 23 1864, RG 92, NA; Greene to Col. J. H. Taylor 
January 30 1863, RG 92, NA; H. E. Simmons to Greene January 23 1864, RG 92, NA; E.H. Holmes to 
E. Greene January 23 1864, RG 92, NA; W. A. Benedict to Greene January 23 1864, RG 92, NA; M.
C. Perry to Greene January 22 1864, RG 92, NA.
57 See for instance J. M. Brown to M. Meigs, December 9 1864, RG 92, NA; C. Dana to 
James Ferree and William Slade January 10 1865, RG 92, NA; C. W. Foster to E. H. Day, December 7 
1864, RG 92, NA.
58 On the initial condition o f incoming villagers and the spread o f new diseases, see D. 3 . 
Nichols to E. M. Greene, January 23, 1864; H. E. Simmons to Greene January 23 1864; Greene to Col. 
Charles Thomas January 23 1864, all filed in RG 92, NA.
59 On physical conditions and mobility restrictions on Mason's Island, see Ludington and 
Compton to Col. J. Hardie July 30 1864, RG 159, NA; R. Raybum to J. Eaton, September 8 1865, RG 
92, NA; K. Knox to J. Hardie October 13 1864, RG 159, NA; Knox to Hardie October 19 1864.
60 For copies o f  labor and apprenticeship contracts, see General Contracts authored by Elias 
Greene, 1864, filed in RG 159, NA. For a government evaluation o f hiring on Mason's Island, see K. 
Knox to J. Hardie, October 13 1864, RG 159, NA and Knox to Hardie October 19 1864, RG 159, NA.
61 Statistics cited in Berlin, et al, Wartime Genesis o f  Free Labor, p. 261.
62 For lists o f employment locations, see "Register o f Freedmen Departing from Mason's 
Island, 1864-1865," filed in RG 105, NA. For complaints o f "bound out" Mason's Island freedmen, see 
testimony o f Samuel Brown, September 1865, RG 105, NA and Carter Holmes to Col. Wm. Beebe 
April 22 1867, RG 105, NA.
75
[Notes to pages 29-34]
63 For black resistance to the contract labor system, see Berlin, et al, Wartime Genesis o f  Free 
Labor, 260-261; Knox to Hardie, October 19 1864, RG 159, NA; Greene to J. H. Taylor, January 30 
1863, RG 92, NA.
64 The only article devoted to education at the Village is Roberta Schildt, "Aladdin's Lamp: 
Education in Freedmen's Village," Arlington Historical Magazine, Volume 10 (3),(1995), pp. 7-18. It 
focuses on the school conditions and the high attendance rate rather than analyzing curriculum. For 
the views o f Village officials on Village education, see J. M. Brown to George B. Carse, February 11 
1865, RG 105, NA and E. Greene to J. H. Taylor, January 30 1863, RG 92, NA.
65 See appropriate books and articles on Midwest and Sea Island cited above, especially Rose, 
Rehearsal, which has great descriptions o f debates between missionaries and military officials.
66 Quote taken directly from the "American Tract Society Constitution," cited in Edwin 
Gaustad, ed, American Tract Society Documents: 1824-1925 (New York: Amo Press, 1972), p. 6 and 
Clarence Griffin, Their Brothers'Keepers (New Bmnswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1960), p. 
192.
67 "Duties o f Masters" is included in Seth Bliss, Letters to the Members, Patrons, and Friends 
o f  the Branch o f  the American Tract Society in Boston (Boston, Crocker and Brewster, 1858), quote 
taken from p. 136.
68 For reaction to "Duties" see Griffin, pp. 192-197.
69 For details o f the split, see Bliss, pp. 1-140. This source is a collection o f contentious 
letters and speeches regarding the issue. The most openly abolitionist speech in the collection was 
given by William Wilberforce and entitled "The Enormity o f the Slave Trade and the Duty o f Seeking 
the Moral and Spiritual Elevation o f the Colored Race." (Boston: American Tract Society, specific 
date o f publishing unknown—probably 1858).
70 Isaac Brinckerhoff, Advice to Freedmen (New York: AMS Press, 1980), pp. 18-19.
71 See Brinckerhoff, pp. 15-25; Jared Waterbury, Friendly Counsels fo r  Freedmen (New 
York: AMS Press, 1980); Helen Brown, John Freeman and His Family (New York: AMS Press, 
1980); Clinton Fisk, Plain Counsels fo r  Freedmen (New York: AMS Press, 1980).
72 See American Tract Society, The Freedman's Spelling Book (New York: AMS Press, 
1980). American Tract Society, The Freedmen's Second Reader (New York: AMS Press, 1980). 
American Tract Society, The Freedmen's Third Reader (New York: AMS Press, 1980).
73 See the nearly identical monthly or weekly (the periods for each varied) issues o f The 
Freedman (1864-1869) and The Freedman's Journal, 1865-1866.
74 Quotes taken from Carlton Mabee, Sojourner Truth (New York: New York University 
Press, 1993), pp. 120-122, and Erlene Stetson and Linda David, Glorying in Tribulation: The 
Lifework o f  Sojourner Truth (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1994), pp. 
146-150.
75 Quotes taken from Fisk, 47, The Freedman, January 1864, and The Freedman's Journal, 
January 1865.
76 Waterbury 5-7.
76
[Notes to pages 34-38]
77 For an overview o f the more liberal AMA see Clara Deboer, His Soul is Marching On: 
African Americans Who Taught the Freedmen fo r  the American Missionary Association (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1995), and Griffin, pp. 190-200. For an overview o f Northern missionary 
associations in general, see Charles Cole, The Social Ideas o f  the Northern Evangelicals (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1954). Though Cole focuses mostly on famous abolitionist fire-eaters who 
fomented sectional tension, his work does examine the slavery and race-related divisions within the 
religious community. Quotes about education taken from NFRA publications: The National 
Freedman, February 1865 and June 1866; The Freedman's Advocate October 1864 and August 1864.
78 For complaints about contraband marriage practices see W. F. Spurgan to S. N. Clark, 
November 20 1865, RG 105, NA. For the general historiographical debate surrounding freedmen 
education, see the following monographs: James Anderson, The Education o f  Blacks in the South: 
1860-1935 (London: University o f North Carolina Press, 1988); Henry Swint, The Northern Teacher 
in the South: 1862-1870 (New York: Octagon Books, 1967); Robert Morris, Reading, 'Riting, and 
Reconstruction: The Education o f  Freedmen in The South, 1861-1870 (London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981); Ronald Butchart, Northern Schools, Southern Blacks, and Reconstruction: 
Freedmen's Education, 1862-1875 (London: Greenwood Press, 1980); and Jacqueline Jones, SoIdiers 
o f  Light and Love (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1980). Swint tends to heroicize 
Northern teachers; he acknowledges the varying motives for becoming a teacher in the South, but does 
not analyze curriculum and its message. Morris has a more pessimistic view o f  curriculum in general, 
especially that o f the American Tract Society. Both give ample agency to the freedmen themselves, 
who spearheaded the educational effort with their eager attendance and demand for education. Though 
Butchart distinguishes between "secular" and "sectarian" educational organizations, he concludes that 
most members o f  both categories (especially the latter) offered decidedly conservative educational 
philosophies and placed far too much blind faith in "free labor" and the market economy. Jones has a 
more positive view o f Northern teachers, claiming that most were genuinely liberal abolitionists. She 
does admit that many o f them held condescending beliefs about the effects o f slavery and used 
traditional classroom strategies that did not work well with freedmen. For information on attendance 
at the Village school, see Schildt, "Aladdin's Lamp."
79 For evidence o f the intensification in Village policy, see Benjamin Wade to O. C. Howard, 
April 3 1867, RG 105, NA; Dangerfield Beverly to Andrew Johnson, September 27 1865; testimony of 
Lieut. Lomas, September 1865; testimony o f Liley Bailey, September 1865; W. W. Rogers to A. A. 
Lawrence August 18 1866; S. N. Clark to W. W. Rogers December 29 1866; Clark to Lawrence 
November 2 1866; Lawrence to O. C. Howard, Febmary 18, 1867; Clark to Burgevin, March 7 1866;
J. M. Brown to F. B. Median June 12 1865, all filed in RG 105, NA.
80 For evidence o f deterioration o f conditions at the Village and Mason's Island, see A. A. 
Lawrence to C. H. Howard October 31 1866; S. N. Clark to C. H. Howard December 31 1866; Clark to 
Howard, May 31 1866; J. H. McBlair to Howard, May 9 1866; R. Rayburn to Col. J. Eaton September 
8 1865, all filed in RG 105, NA.
81 Clark to Burgevin, March 7 1866, RG 105, NA.
82 For data on hirings, see "Register o f Freedmen Departing Mason's Island," RG 105, NA.
83 Testimony o f James Graw, April 1866, RG 105, NA.
84 Testimony o f Joseph Hall on behalf o f Rindy Allen, September 1865, RG 105, NA
85 Carter Holmes to Lieut. Col. Wm. Beebe, April 22 1867, cited in Berlin, et al. The Wartime 
Genesis o f  Free Labor, p. 346.
77
[Notes to pages 38-44]
86 For data on Village contrabands sent to Arkansas, see S. P. Lee to C. H. Howard, January 
22 1867 and H. Sweeney to Col. H. Page, both filed in RG 105, NA, and also cited in Reidy, 
"Freedmen's Village," p. 416.
87 For the protest documents o f various villagers, see Benjamin Wade to C. H. Howard, April 
3 1867; Dangerfield Beverly to Andrew Johnson and accompanying testimony, September 27, 1865; 
W. W. Rogers to A. A. Lawrence August 18, 1866, enclosing the complaint o f  contraband Jerry 
Savage; Lawrence to Howard, January 7, 1867 regarding meeting o f angry Village freedmen; 
Reverend Robert Laws et al. to Howard, December 1866, outlining freedmen grievances; John 
Peterson to Howard December 26 1866; Clark to Lawrence November 2 1866; Hannah Turner to
________(no name designated) November 13 1866; Laws, Nelson Wormley, and S. Robinson to
________(no name designated) January 1 1867; Laws to Howard, January 14 1867, all filed in RG
105, NA.
88 For documents specifically requesting land ownership rights, see Lawrence to Howard, 
January 7, 1867; Laws, et al to Howard, December 1866; Peterson to Howard, December 26 1866; 
Laws, Wormley, Robinson, et al to , January 1 1867; Laws to Howard, January 14, 1867, all
filed under RG 105, NA.
89 For details on leaseholders, see A. A. Lawrence to C. H. Howard October 31 1866, RG 
105, NA, and Reidy, "Freedmen's Village," 419. For details on those families who set up homes just 
outside the Village, see W. W. Rogers to S. P. Lee, November 27 1866, RG 105, NA and Reidy, 
"Freedmen's Village," pp. 419-420.
90 See W. F. Spurgon to S. N. Clark, November 20 1865, RG 105, NA.
91 See R. Laws to C. H. Howard, December 31 1866, RG 105, NA; Stetson and David, pp. 
148-150; Mabee, pp. 148-152; Laws to J. W. Vandenburgh, November 15 1866, RG 105, NA; 
Announcement o f Captain J. M. Brown regarding Village resident Steward Gwynn returning from 
New York, March 23 1865, RG 105, NA. Note: Records regarding the fate o f Village freedmen 
moving North are extremely rare, while those o f freedmen contracted to Southern planters are far more 
abundant. That Villagers who headed North found stable jobs and friendlier environments is a 
plausible assumption, especially considering that Northern families who "applied" for Village 
freedmen generally expressed an earnest desire to employ blacks in "good places."
92 For comparative analyses o f the economic ideas o f freedmen and those o f federal officials, 
see Saville, The Work o f  Reconstruction, Ransom and Sutch, One Kind o f  Freedom, Willie Lee Rose, 
Rehearsal fo r  Reconstruction, Edward Magdol, A Right to the Land, and Laura Edwards, Gendered 
Strife and Confusion.
93 For these comments, see S. N. Clark to W. W. Rogers, December 29 1866, RG 105, NA.
94 See relevant documents cited above for an outline o f worsening conditions. For documents 
that reveal evidence o f  government officials explicitly rejecting the pleas o f the Villagers, see 
Lawrence to Howard, February 18 1867, C. S. B. Wall to Howard, April 13 1867, Clark to Burgevin, 
March 7 1866, and J. M. Brown to H. M. Stinson, May 20, 1865, all filed in RG 105, NA.3
95 For a detailed account o f the painfully drawn out process o f legally removing the freedmen, 
one that lasted until the end o f the nineteenth century, see James, "Decline," and Reidy, "Freedmen's 
Village"; Washington Post, December 7, 1887, and New York Herald, December 7, 1887.
96 Quoted in Ames, "Eastern Shore," p. 440.
78
[Notes to pages 44-54]
97 Quoted in Ames, pp. 434-5 and John Dix, Memoirs o f  John A. Dix (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1883), p. 25 and p. 31.
98 Ames, pp. 438-400, and Dix, pp. 30-35.
99 Ames, pp. 438-400, and Dix, pp. 38-39.
100 Proclamation cited in Ames, "Eastern Shore," pp. 442-3, and Dix, pp. 40-1.
101 For a detailed first-person account o f the Dix expedition, see Alfred Davenport, Camp and 
Field Life o f  the Fifth New York Voluntary Regiment (New York: Dick and Fitzgerald, 1879), pp. 125- 
133, and Ames, "Eastern Shore," pp. 444-456.
102 Quote taken from General Henry Lockwood to Col. W. P. Whipple, August 7 1862, RG
107, NA.
103 Major H. Hayman to General Robert Schenck, September 16 1863 and General V. Massey 
to Captain R. F. Duvall, November 21 1863, both filed in RG 393, NA. See also C. S. Henry to Col. 
Kinsman January 10 1864 and Henry to Kinsman March 23 1864, both filed in RG 105, NA.
104 See Henry to Kinsman, Febmary 29 1864 and Henry to Kinsman, January 10 1864, both 
filed in RG 105, NA.
105 See Hayman to Schenck, September 16, 1863 and Massey to Duvall, November 21 1863, 
both filed in RG 393, NA. See also "Special Order #76 from the Provost Marshall on the Eastern 
Shore o f Virginia," October 24 1864, RG 393, NA.
106 See Hayman to Schenck, Henry to Kinsman, January 10 1864, and Henry to Kinsman, 
March 30, 1864, RG 105, NA.
107 See Henry to Kinsman, Febmary 29 1864, and "Circular from the Office o f Provost 
Marshall for Accomack and Northampton Counties," Febmary 12 1864, RG 393, NA.
108 See "Special Order #76 from the Provost Marshall o f the Eastern Shore o f Virginia," 
October 24 1864, (unnumbered) "Special Order from the Provost Marshall o f Virginia," November 4 
1864, Lt. Colonel and Provost Marshall Frank J. White to Thomas R. Joynes, November 1 1864, and 
White to Edward Ord, Febmary 6 1865, all filed in RG 393, NA.
109 See above documents for an overview on the new Shore labor policy. Quotes taken 
directly from "Special Order #76" and (unnumbered) "Special Order," October and November 1864.
1,0 See White to Captain Mahon, November 11 1864, RG 393, NA, Mahon to Natson (?), 
December 23 1864, RG 393, NA and above documents. Quotes taken from White to Mahon and 
Mahon to Natson.
111 See (unnumbered) "Special Order," White to Joynes, and White to Ord. Quotes taken from 
"Special Order" and White to Joynes.
112 See above documents. Quotes taken from White to Ord, Febmary 6 1865.
113 See White to Ord, White to G. C. Taylor, Febmary 11 1865, and "Special Order #74 from 
the Provost Marshall o f  the Eastern Shore o f Virginia," October 22 1864, all filed in RG 393, NA.
79
[Notes to pages 54-60]
114 See White to H. E. Stem, November 2 1864, White to T. Elliot, January 31 1865, both 
filed in RG 393, NA. See also "General Order #2 from the Provost Marshall o f the Eastern Shore of 
Virginia," March 6 1866, and "General Order #3 from the Provost Marshall o f the Eastern Shore o f 
Virginia," March 19 1866, filed in RG 105, NA.
115 See Stuart Bames to O. Brown, June 21 1865, RG 105, NA, and White to Benjamin 
Butler, November (?) 1864, RG 393, NA.
116 For several examples o f  Shore labor contracts, see "Miscellaneous Labor Contracts, 1865," 
filed in RG 105, NA.
117 See B. L. Parish to Edwin Stanton, January 16 1865, RG 94, NA, and "Circular Order from 
the Provost Marshall o f  the Eastern Shore o f  Virginia," January 1865, RG 393, NA.
118 See Ed, Murphy to O. Brown, January 31 1867, RG 105, NA, and White to Ord, Febmary
6 1865.
119 For Bureau policy on the Eastern Shore, see especially "Circular #13," April 4 1866,
"General Order #5," May 4 1866, to O. Brown, January 3 1866, and O. S. Pride to O. Brown,
March 5 1866, all filed in RG 105, NA. For an overview o f federal charity and benevolence under the 
wartime administration and the Bureau, see the following documents: C. S. Henry to Col. Kinsman, 
March 30 1864, RG 105, NA, White to Ord, Febmary 6 1865, RG 393, NA, White to Stem, November 
2 1864, RG 393, NA, White to G. C. Taylor, Febmary 1 1865, RG 393, NA, "Special Order #74 from 
the Provost Marshall o f the Eastern Shore o f Virginia," October 22 1864, RG 393, NA, "Circular Order 
from the Provost Marshall o f the Eastern Shore o f Virginia," December 23 1864, RG 393, NA, White 
to T. Elliot, January 31 1865, RG 393, NA, White to T. Elliot Febmary 11 1865, RG 393, NA, White 
to Col. Small, Febmary 14 1865, RG 393, NA, Stuart Bames to O. Brown, June 21 1865, RG 105, NA, 
William P. Londte to A. S. Flagg, September 4 1865, RG 105, NA, "General Order #2," March 6 
1866, RG 105, NA, and "General Order #3," March 19 1866, RG 105, NA.
120 See O. S. Pride to O. Brown, March 5 1866, RG 105, NA.
121 See J. Lord to A. S. Flagg, September 1 1865, RG 105, NA.
122 See William Londte to A. S. Flagg, September 4 1865, RG 105, NA.
123 See "Circular #14," April 4 1866, RG 105, NA.
124 See Ed. Murphy to O. Brown, January 1 1867, RG 105, NA. For general discussions and 
debates regarding the forces behind the development o f sharecropping, see the following: Jonathan 
Wiener and Harold Woodman. "American Historical Review  Fomm: Class Structure and Economic 
Development in the American South, 1865-1955," American Historical Review, Volume 84 (4), 
(October 1979), pp. 970-1006; Ransom and Sutch, One Kind o f  Freedom', Saville, The Work o f  
Reconstruction-, and Magdol, A Right to the Land.
125 See "Circular from the Provost Marshall o f the Eastern Shore o f Virginia," January 1865, 
RG 393, NA, and Murphy to Brown.
126 See H. O. Sidney to A. S. Flagg, July 10 1865, RG 105, NA, William Londte to Flagg, 
September 4 1865, RG 105, NA, John H. Offner ("on behalf o f the people") to Major G. P. Sherwood, 
June 17 1867, RG 105, NA, Jackson (?) to S. C. Armstrong, June 6 1867, RG 105, NA, and O. S. Pride 
to O. Brown, April 1 1866, RG 105, NA.
80
[Notes to pages 61-69]
127 For general evidence o f wartime hostility toward Shore freedmen, see C. S. Henry to Col. 
Kinsman, March 23 1864, RG 105, NA, General V. Massey to Captain R. F. Duvall, November 21 
1863, RG 393, NA, and "Special Order #70 from the Provost Marshall o f the Eastern Shore o f 
Virginia," October 15 1864, RG 393, NA.
128 See General A. H. Henry to Brig. Gen. S F. Bamstein, August 5 1866, RG 393, NA, M. 
French to S. C. Armstrong, July 25 1866, RG 105, NA, and testimony o f Major General A. H. Terry, 
August 9 1866, RG 105, NA. Long quote taken from French to Armstrong.
129 See French to James A. Bates, July 30 1866, RG 105, NA, T. H. Evans to French, July 27 
1866, RG 105, NA, "Complaints o f  Freedmen James Seymor," June 30 1866, RG 105, NA, Nelson A. 
Miles to Fort Monroe, July 30, 1866, RG 105, NA, Ed. Murphy to O. Brown, October 31 1866, RG 
105, NA, and Ed. Murphy to O. Brown, January 30 1866, RG 105, NA.
130 For recent scholarship on the Ku Klux Klan and violence directed against Southern 
freedmen, see Nelson, Iron Confederacies, especially chapters 5-6, Edwards, Gendered Strife and 
Confusion, and Hayden, "An Incident o f  Outrage."
131 See French to Armstrong, July 25 1866, RG 105, NA, French to Bates, July 30 1866, RG 
105, NA, General A. H. Terry to Brig. General S. F. Bamstein, August 5 1866, RG 105, NA, and 
Testimony o f  General A. H. Terry, recorded August 9 1866, RG 105, NA.
132 For evidence o f local law enforcement problems and official reluctance, see Ed. Murphy to 
O. Brown, January 30, 1866, RG 105, NA, testimony o f George Pew, recorded August 9 1866, RG 
105, NA, testimony o f William Dix, recorded August 9 1866, RG 105, NA, French to Armstrong, July 
25, 1866, RG 105, NA, and T. H. Evans to French, July 27 1866, RG 105, NA.
133 See French to Bates, July 30, 1866, RG 105, NA, testimony of General A. H. Terry, 
recorded August 9 1866, RG 105, NA, Ed. Murphy to O. Brown January 30 1866, RG 105, NA,
French to Armstrong, July 25 1866, RG 105, NA, testimony o f William Dix, recorded August 9 1866, 
RG 105, NA, Ed. Murphy to S. C. Armstrong, November 26 1866, RG 105, NA, and General 
Sherwood to Lt. E. W. Stone, November 27 1867, RG 105, NA.
134 Quote taken from Foner, 610. For general "revisionist" narrative o f Reconstruction, see Les 
Benedict, A Compromise o f  Principle, which focuses mostly on Reconstruction during the Johnson 
administration, and Gillette, Retreat from Reconstruction, which focuses on the Grant and Hayes 
administrations.
81
Bibliography 
Archival Primary Sources
Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General, Record Group 92, National 
Archives, Washington, D. C.
Records of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, Record 
Group 105, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
Records of the United States Army Continental Commands, Record Group 393, 
National Archives, Washington, D. C.
Records of the Office of the Inspector General, Record Group 159, National 
Archives, Washington, D. C.
Records of the Secretary of War, Record Group 107, National Archives, Washington, 
D. C.
Records of the Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records Library, 
Record Group 45, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
Scott, R. N., et al (eds). War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records 
of The Union and Confederate Armies. Washington, D. C.
Newspapers and Periodicals
The Daily National Intelligencer
Harper's Weekly
The New York Herald
The Washington Evening Star
The Washington Post
American Tract Society Periodicals:
The Freedman
The Freedman's Journal
Publications o f  the National Freedmen fs R elief Association:
The Freedman's Advocate
82
The National Freedman
A Circular to the Friends of Humanity
Published Primary Sources
American Tract Society. The Freedman's Spelling Book. New York: AMS Press, 
1980.
American Tract Society. The Freedmen's Second Reader. New York: AMS Press, 
1980.
American Tract Society. The Freedmen's Third Reader. New York: AMS Press,
1980.
Bliss, Seth. Letters to the Members, Patrons, and Friends of the Branch o f the
American Tract Society in Boston. Boston, Crocker and Brewster, 1858.
Brinckerhoff, Isaac. Advice to Freedmen. New York: AMS Press, 1980.
Brown, Helen. John Freeman and His Family. New York: AMS Press, 1980.
Child, Lydia Maria. The Freedmen's Book. New York: AMS Press, 1980.
Cudsworth, Warren. History of the First Regiment, Massachusetts Infantry. Boston: 
Walker, Fuller, and Company, 1866.
Coffin, Charles. Four Years o f Fighting, A Volume of Personal Observations with 
the Army and Navy, from the First Battle of Bull Run to the Fall of 
Richmond. Boston: Tickner and Fields, 1866.
Davenport, Alfred. Camp and Field Life of the Fifth New York Voluntary Infantry. 
New York: Dick and Fitzgerald, 1879.
Dix, John. Memoirs of John A. Dix. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1883.
Eaton, John. Grant, Lincoln, and the Freedmen. London: Longmans, Green, and 
Company, 1907.
Fisk, Clinton. Plain Counsels for Freedmen. New York: AMS Press, 1980.
Gaustad, Edwin, ed. American Tract Society Documents: 1824-1925. New York: 
Amo Press, 1972.
Ira Berlin, Leslie Joseph Reidy, and Leslie Rowland, eds. Freedom's Soldiers: The
83
Black Military Experience in the Civil War. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998.
Ira Berlin, Barbara J. Fields, Travolia Glymph, Joseph P. Reidy, and Leslie Rowland, 
Eds. Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867: Series 
I, Volume I: The Destruction of Slavery. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985.
Ira Berlin, Steven Miller, Joseph Reidy, and Leslie Rowland, eds. Freedom: A
Documentary History of Emancipation. 1861-1867: Series I, Volume II: The 
Wartime Genesis of Free Labor: The Upper South. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993.
Ira Berlin, Joseph P. Reidy, and Leslie Rowland, eds. Freedom: A Documentary 
History Of Emancipation, 1861 -1867: Series II: The Black Military 
Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Macanamara, Michael. The Irish Ninth in Bivouac and Battle. Boston, Lee and 
Shepard, 1867.
McPherson, James. The Negro's Civil War. New York: Pantheon Books, 1965.
Noyes, George. The Bivouac and the Battlefield. New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1864.
Russell, William Howard. My Diary North and South. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1988.
Swint, Henry, ed. Dear Ones at Home: Letters from Contraband Camps. Nashville: 
Vanderbilt University Press, 1966.
Taylor, Benjamin F. Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain, With Pictures of Life in 
Camp and Field. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1872.
Taylor, Susie King. A Black Woman's Civil War Memoirs. New York: Marcus 
Wiener Publishing, 1988.
Waterbury, Jared. Friendly Counsels for Freedmen. New York: AMS Press, 1980.
Wilberforce, William. The Enormity of the Slave Trade and the Duty of Seeking the 
Moral and Spiritual Elevation of the Colored Race. Boston: American Tract 
Society, specific date of publishing unknown—probably 1858.
84
Secondary Books
Anderson, James. The Education of Blacks in the South: 1860-1935. London: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1988.
Berry, Mary F. Military Necessity and Civil Rights Policy. London: National 
University Publications, 1977.
Butchart, Ronald. Northern Schools, Southern Blacks, and Reconstruction: 
Freedmen’s Education, 1862-1875. London: Greenwood Press, 1980.
Carter, Dan. When the War Was Over. London: Louisiana University Press, 1985.
Click, Patricia. Time Full of Trial: The Roanoke Island Freedmen's Colony, 1862- 
1867. London: University o f North Carolina Press. 2001.
Cole, Charles. The Social Ideas of Northern Evangelicals, 1826-1860. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1954.
Cox, Lawanda. Lincoln and Black Freedom. Columbia, S. C.: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1981.
DeBoer, Clara. His Soul is Marching On: African Americans Who Taught the 
Freedmen for the American Missionary Association. New York:
Garland Publishing, 1995.
Edwards, Laura. Gendered Strife and Confusion: The Political Culture of 
Reconstruction. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1997.
Engs, Robert. Freedom's First Generation. Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania 
Press, 1979.
Erlene Stetson and Linda David. Glorying in Tribulation: The Lifework of Sojourner 
Truth. East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1994.
Foner, Eric. Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution. New York: Harper 
& Row Publishers, 1988.
Gibson, William. Virtual Light. New York: Bantam Books, 1993.
Gillette, William. Retreat from Reconstruction, 1869-1879. London: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1979.
Gerteis, Louis. From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward Southern 
Blacks, 1861-1865. London: Greenwood Press, 1973.
85
Green, Constance. The Secret City: A History of Race Relations in the Nation’s 
Capital. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967.
Griffin, Clarence. Their Brothers’ Keepers. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 1960.
Hargrove, Hondon. Black Union Soldiers in the Civil War. London: McFarland 
Publishers, 1988.
Hermann, Janet Lee. Pursuit of a Dream. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.
Jones, Jacqueline. Soldiers of Light and Love: Northern Teachers and Georgia 
Blacks, 1865-1873. Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 
1980.
Leech, Margaret. Reville in Washington, 1861-1865. New York: lim e  
Incorporated, 1941.
Les Benedict, Michael. A Compromise of Principle: Congressional Republicans and 
Reconstruction, 1863-1869.
Litwack, Leon. Been in the Storm So Long. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980.
Litwack, Leon. Trouble in Mind. New York: Vintage Books, 1998.
Mabee, Carlton. Sojourner Truth. New York: New York University Press, 1993.
Magdol, Edward. A Right to the Land: Essays on the Freedmen's Community. 
London: Greenwood Press, 1977.
McCrary, Peyton. Abraham Lincoln and Reconstruction: The Louisiana Experiment. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978.
McPherson, James. The Struggle for Equality. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1964.
Mohr, Clarence. On the Threshold of Freedom: Masters and Slaves in Civil War 
Georgia. London: University of Georgia Press, 1986.
Morris, Robert. Reading, 'Riting, and Reconstruction: The Education of Freedmen in 
The South, 1861-1870. London: University of Chicago Press, 1981.
Nelson, Scott. Iron Confederacies: Southern Railways, Klan Violence, and 
Reconstruction. London: University o f North Carolina Press, 1999.
86
Quarles, Benjamin. The Negro in the Civil War. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1953.
Ripley, C. Peter. Slaves and Freedmen in Civil War Louisiana. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1976.
Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch. One Kind of Freedom: The Economic
Consequences O f Emancipation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001 .
Rose, C. B. Arlington County Virginia: A History. Arlington, VA: Arlington 
Historical Society, 1976.
Rose, Willie Lee. Rehearsal for Reconstruction: The Port Roval Experiment.
New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1964.
Saville, Janet. The Work of Reconstruction: From Slave to Wage Laborer in 
South Carolina, 1860-1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994.
Scott, James. Seeing Like the State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
Swint, Henry. The Northern Teacher in the South: 1862-1870. New York:
Octagon Books, 1967.
Voegeli, V. Jacque. Free but Not Equal: The Midwest and the Negro During the 
Civil War. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967.
Weigley, Russell. Montgomery Meigs: Quartermaster General o f the Union Army. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
Wiley, B. Irvin. Southern Negroes, 1861-1865. New Haven: Yale Univeristy Press, 
1938.
Journal Articles
Ames, Susie. "Federal Policy Toward the Eastern Shore of Virginia in 1861." 
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography. Volume 69 (4), 1961, 
432-459.
Aptheker, Herbert. "The Negro in the Union Navy." Journal of Negro History. 
Volume 32 (2), 169-200.
87
Bigelow, Martha. "Vicksburg: Experiment in Freedom." Journal of Mississippi 
History, Volume 26 (1), 1964, 28-44.
Bigelow, Martha. "Freedmen of the Mississippi Valley, 1862-1865." Civil War 
History. Volume 8 (1), 1962, 38-47.
Bigelow, Martha. "Plantation Lessee Problems in 1864." The Journal o f Southern 
History. Volume 27 (3), 1961, 354-367.
Currie, James T. "Freedmen at Davis Bend, April 1864." Journal of Mississippi 
History. Volume 46 (2), 1984, 120-129.
Foster, Gaines. "The Limitations of Federal Health Care for Freedmen, 1862-1870." 
The Journal o f Southern History. Volume 48 (3), 349-3 72.
Gerteis, Louis. "Salmon P. Chase, Radicalism, and the Politics of Emancipation." 
The Journal o f American History. Volume 60 (1) 1973, 42-62.
Holliday, Joseph. "Freedmen's Aid Societies in Cincinnati, 1862-1870." Cincinnati 
Historical Society Bulletin. Volume 22 (3), 1964, 169-185.
James, Felix. "The Decline and Fall of Freedmen’s Village." Negro History Bulletin. 
Volume 37 (3), 1974, 247-250.
James, Felix. "The Establishment of Freedmen's Village in Arlington, Virginia." 
Negro History Bulletin. Volume 33 (4), 1970, 90-93.
Jonathan Wiener and Harold Woodman. "American Historical Review Forum: Class 
Structure and Economic Development in the American South, 1865-1955." 
Volume 84 (4), October 1979, 970-1006.
Levstik, Frank. "A Journey Among the Contrabands." Indiana Magazine of History.
t  , , __ __ / n  \  -i A n n  nvoiume /3 (.>), iv7/ ,  z u j-2zz.
Messner, William. "Black Violence and White Response: Louisiana, 1862." The 
Journal of Southern History. Volume 41 (1), 1975, 19-38.
Mohr, Clarence. "Before Sherman: Georgia Blacks and the Union War Effort, 
1861-1864." The Journal of Southern History. Volume 45 (3), 1979, 
331-352.
Reidy, Joseph. "Coming From the Shadow of the Past: The Transition from Slavery 
to Freedom and Freedmen's Village, 1863-1900." The Virginia Magazine of 
History and Biography. Volume 95 (4), 1987, 403-428.
Ripley, C. Peter. "The Black Family in Transition: Louisiana, 1860-1865." The
Journal of Southern History. Volume 41 (3), 1975, 369-380.
Ross, Steven J. "Freed Soil, Freed Labor, Freed Men: John Eaton and the Davis
Bend Experiment." The Journal of Southern History. Volume 44 (2), 1978, 
213-232.
Schildt, Roberta. "Aladdin's Lamp: Education in Freedmen's Village." Arlington 
Historical Magazine, Volume 10 (3), 1995, 7-18.
Schildt, Roberta. "Freedman's Village: Arlington, Virginia, 1863-1900."
Arlington Historical Magazine.
Shannon, Fred. "The Federal Government and the Negro Soldier." Journal of Negro 
History. Volume 11.(4), 1926, 563-583.
Walker, Cam. "Corinth: The Story of a Contraband Camp." Civil War History. 
Volume 20 (1), 1974, 5-22.
Unpublished Papers
Hayden, Rene. "An Incident o f Outrage: Gender, Race, Modernity, and the First 
Klan in North Carolina." Written for the 2002 OAH Annual Meeting, 
Washington, D. C.
89
VITA
Zachary C. Lowe
Bom in Greenwich, Connecticut, August 24, 1977. Graduated from 
Greenwich High School in Greenwich, June 1995, B. A., Dartmouth College, 1999. 
M. A. candidate, The College of William and Mary, 2001-2003, with a concentration 
in African-American history and American foreign policy.
In August 2001, the author entered the College of William and Mary as a 
graduate student in the Department of History.
